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ABSTRACT  
ESSAYS ON MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING ACROSS LOCAL LABOR MARKETS 
BY  
MUHAMMAD MUDABBIR HUSAIN 
DECEMBER 2014  
Committee Chair: Dr. BARRY T. HIRSCH  
Major Department: Economics  
Essays in this dissertation address three research questions. (1) What types of persons 
hold dual jobs and what are their motives for doing so? In essay 1, I investigate multiple factors 
that affect the decision to hold more than a single job. Using data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), the first essay documents the characteristics of second jobs and multiple job 
holders in the U.S. I characterize the types of people who hold dual jobs and use additional 
information from the BLS to find out workers’ motives for holding multiple jobs. I examine how 
multiple job holding differs with respect to age, education, race and ethnicity, sex, foreign-born 
status, marital status, public-private worker status, broad industry and occupation.  (2) How does 
dual job holding vary with the business cycle and state of the labor market? Essay 2 explores a 
large micro data set for 1998-2013 that covers most U.S. urban labor markets. We find clear-cut 
evidence that multiple job holding across labor markets and over time is weakly cyclical, thus 
(slightly) exacerbating rather than mitigating the severity of business cycles. Much of the 
cyclicality in multiple job holding seen across labor markets, however, is not causal, dropping 
sharply after accounting for MSA fixed effects. Using longitudinal worker data, there is minimal 
response to unemployment changes within labor markets over time. Our large CPS sample size 
produces precise estimates, albeit ones close to zero, helping explain conflicting results in prior 
studies based on far smaller data sets.  (3) How might one explain the persistent geographical 
differences in multiple job holding? Essay 3 documents what are systematic (i.e., long-run) 
differences in multiple job holding across labor markets (MSAs) and explores possible 
explanations for these differences. Geographical differences in multiple job holding rates have 
received little attention, although the multiple job holding rates in some regions of the country 
 
 
are substantially higher than in other regions, and these differences have been persistent over 
time. Examining correlates of these labor market differences in multiple job holding provides us 
with a better understanding of the determinants of labor supply and how local labor markets 
work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Labor economists have devoted rather limited attention to understanding the holding 
of multiple jobs by workers given its growing prevalence in both developed and developing 
economies. A study by Paxson and Sicherman (1996) reported that on average, 20 percent of 
working males and 12 percent of working females held a second job at some points between 
1976 and 1989. Furthermore, more than half of continuously working American males holds a 
second job at least once during their lives (Foley 1997). Multiple-job holding is also more 
common in developing countries. For example, Unni (1992) found that 50 percent of workers 
in rural Gujarat, India in 1987-88 held two or more jobs.  
 Given the prevalence of dual job holding, the essays in this dissertation address the 
following three research questions. (1) What types of persons hold dual jobs and what are 
their motives for doing so? In essay 1, I investigate multiple factors that affect the decision to 
hold more than a single job. I examine a variety of different “cuts” of the data, such as by age, 
education (skill), race and ethnicity, sex, foreign-born status, marital status, and public-private 
worker status, industries and workers. (2) How does dual job holding vary with the business 
cycle and state of the labor market? Essay 2 explores a large micro data set for 1998-2013 in 
order to examine how multiple job holding by individual workers varies across and within 
U.S. labor markets (MSAs) with respect to changes in local unemployment rates. (3) How 
might one explain the persistent geographical differences in multiple job holding? Essay 3 
documents what are systematic (i.e., long-run) differences in multiple job holding across labor 
markets (MSAs) and explores possible explanations for these differences. 
 This dissertation will enhance our understanding of the labor market in the U.S. by 
providing information on the multiple job labor supply decision of workers. The available 
 2 
 
literature on dual job holding explores determinants and motives of multiple job holding and 
offers some cross country comparisons of descriptive evidence, although none does that 
explicitly using recent data. Most of the studies used data from the 1990s, but the topic of dual 
jobs has received less attention as of late. Furthermore, surprisingly little has been written 
about the effect of the business cycle on multiple jobs. Examining the effect of the business 
cycle on the multiple job holding decision and occupational mismatch of primary and 
secondary jobs over the business cycle may improve understanding of the process of job 
creation and destruction during expansions and recessions. There exist virtually no studies that 
have examined the quality of the match between the primary and secondary jobs. And 
although there are persistent regional differences in multiple job holding, even after 
accounting for detailed worker and job characteristics, these differences are not widely known 
and the sources for these differences are not understood. 
 Multiple job holding can reflect imperfections or disequilibrium in the labor market. 
Workers may hold a second job due to the existence of employer-employee mismatch owing 
to imperfect information or wage inflexibility in the labor market. Multiple job holding can 
play an important role in the economy by responding to firms’ just-in-time labor needs 
(Catalina and Kimmel 2009). Learning more about the determinants and implications of dual 
jobs can help us to better understand the efficiency of labor markets. Hipple (2010) stated that 
about two-thirds of the men who held multiple jobs in 1996 usually worked full time on their 
primary job and part time on their secondary job.
1
 13 percent usually worked part time on all 
their jobs and about 4 percent usually worked full time on both their primary and secondary 
                                                             
 
1
 A full-time job is one in which a person works 35 hours or more per week and a part-time job is one in which a 
person works less than 35 hours per week. This dissertation uses the “usual measures” in the ORGs, but the 
official BLS definition is for hours in the previous week. 
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jobs. By comparison, one-third of the women holding more than one job worked at multiple 
part-time jobs, while one-half usually worked full time on their primary and part time on their 
secondary jobs. The importance of part time relative to full time multiple job holding also has 
increased over time. 
 The data used for this dissertation comes from the Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group 
(ORG) of each monthly Currently Population Survey (CPS), a large household survey 
conducted by the Census Bureau and a joint product with the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Questions on multiple jobs were introduced into the monthly CPS beginning in January 1994 
(a few earlier CPS supplements also contained information on multiple jobs). The ORG files 
contain information on earnings, usual hours worked, and union status of the primary job the 
week prior to the survey, information not provided for the other CPS rotation groups.
2
 The 
ORGs also provide information on multiple job holding, detailed industry and occupation, and 
a plethora of demographic, location, and employment information collected monthly from all 
rotation groups. For this dissertation, I use CPS data from 1998-2013. The primary advantage 
of CPS data is that the samples are large, nationally representative, and current data are 
readily available. 
 This dissertation consists of three unified essays. Using the CPS data, the first essay 
documents the characteristics of second jobs and multiple job holders in U.S. I characterize 
the types of people who hold dual jobs. I also uses the BLS information to find out workers’ 
motives for holding multiple jobs. I examine how multiple job holding differs with respect to 
                                                             
 
2
Detailed discussion of the ORG files is included in the data section. 
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age, education, race and ethnicity, sex, foreign-born status, marital status, public-private 
worker status, broad industry and occupation.  
 The second essay investigates how multiple-job holding varies with the business cycle 
and state of local economies. Multiple job holding can either exacerbate or mitigate 
employment changes over the business cycle. Theory is ambiguous because of competing 
labor supply effects and the absence of market clearing during recessions. Previous literature 
is inconclusive. Using a large Current Population Survey (CPS) data set for 1998-2013 that 
covers most U.S. urban labor markets, we find clear-cut evidence that multiple job holding 
across labor markets and over time is weakly cyclical, thus (slightly) exacerbating rather than 
mitigating the severity of business cycles. Much of the cyclicality in multiple job holding seen 
across labor markets, however, is not causal, dropping sharply after accounting for MSA fixed 
effects. Using longitudinal worker data, there is minimal response to unemployment changes 
within labor markets over time. Our large CPS sample size produces precise estimates, albeit 
ones close to zero, helping explain conflicting results in prior studies based on far smaller data 
sets. Given the small changes in multiple job holding over the business cycle, it is fair to 
characterize the relationship as acyclic. 
 The third essay documents and attempts to explain the systematic (i.e., long-run) 
differences in multiple job holding across labor markets (MSAs). It examines the size and 
pattern of MSA fixed effects; that is, those differences in multiple job holding across U.S. 
labor markets that cannot be accounted for by detailed covariates. Geographical differences in 
multiple job holding rates have received little attention, although the multiple job holding 
rates in some regions of the country are substantially higher than in other regions, and these 
differences have been persistent over time. Examining correlates of these labor market 
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differences in multiple job holding provides us with a better understanding of the determinants 
of labor supply and how local labor markets work.   
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1 MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING DETERMINANTS AND TRENDS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Multiple job holding (moonlighting) is an important feature of the U.S labor market. 
According to the U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2013 about 6.5 million workers in the U.S 
(about 5 percent of all employed workers) held multiple jobs. Using longitudinal data, a study 
by Paxson and Sicherman (1996) reported that on average, 20 percent of working males and 
12 percent of working females held a second job at some points between 1976 and 1989. 
Stinson (1997) showed that the growth of multiple job holdings increased modestly from 5.2 
percent in 1970 to over 6 percent in the 1990s overall, while moonlighting among women 
have increased from 2.2 percent to about 6 percent. Dual job holding, however, edged 
downward to 5.2 percent during 2006-2009 (Hipple 2010) and has remained at a low level. 
This variability in dual job holding across time and worker groups suggests that further 
research into the determinants and role of dual jobs in the U.S labor market is warranted. 
 A dual job holder is defined as having a second job, part time or full time, in addition 
to a primary full-time job. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses the broader and more 
descriptive term 'multiple jobholding'. Hipple (2010) describes how using the CPS, BLS 
defines a multiple jobholder as an individual who (1) had a job as a wage and salary worker 
with two or more employers, (2) combined a wage and salary job with self-employment, or 
(3) combined a wage and salary job with one as an unpaid family worker. Excluded are people 
who were self-employed or unpaid family workers on their primary job and held a secondary 
job as a self-employed worker or an unpaid family worker. 
Among the types of jobs associated with moonlighting (based on the primary job) are 
temporary agency workers, on-call workers, college teachers, entertainment workers in 
 7 
 
contract work, independent consultants and self employed workers. Although multiple job 
holding is an important feature of the U.S labor market, literature is limited regarding who is 
likely to hold multiple jobs (with respect to gender, age, education, race/ethnicity, foreign 
born status, marital status etc.), the reasons for dual job holding, and the role played by dual 
job holding in the labor market. Although the principal reason for the limited study of 
multiple job holding is data limitations, few studies have made use of the data that do exist. 
Multiple job holding can reflect imperfections or disequilibrium in the labor market. 
Workers may hold a second job due to the existence of employer-employee mismatch owing 
to imperfect information or wage inflexibility in the labor market. Multiple job holding can 
play an important role in the economy by responding to firms’ just-in-time labor needs 
(Catalina and Kimmel 2009). Learning more about the determinants and implications of dual 
jobs can help us to better understand the efficiency of labor markets. 
The principal aim of this essay is to address the broad question, what are the 
characteristics of people who hold dual jobs and what are their motives for doing so?  
1.2 WHY DO WORKERS HOLD MULTIPLE JOBS? 
Most explanations for taking multiple jobs can be grouped into one of two categories, 
either because of an “hours constraint” or in order to obtain a preferred “job portfolio.” An 
hours constraint on a worker’s principal (say, highest wage) job can readily explain why a 
worker might increase utility by taking a second job, even at a lower wage. Alternatively, a 
worker not facing an hours constraint on the first job may take a higher paying second job that 
does have constrained hours; say, a temporary job or limited hours per week. Roughly 45 
percent of U.S. wage and salary workers are salaried rather than paid by the hour. Although 
salaried jobs generally do not have any explicit hours constraint, they do have an “earnings 
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constraint” that can work in much the same way, leading some salaried workers to take a 
second job in order to increase their earnings.
3
  
 Conway and Kimmel (2001) focused on why people moonlight; more specifically, 
whether it was an hours constraint on the primary job or the greater satisfaction associated 
with the second job. Using the 1984 panel of Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), they found that young and more educated workers are more likely to moonlight and 
more educated workers tend to moonlight more. Also, Renna (2006) found that the incidence 
of moonlighting increases when workers are seeking to increase their total hours of work. He 
used the Luxemburg Employment Survey (LES) to find out how overtime premiums on the 
primary job affect the decision of overtime and moonlighting. Using the May 1991 dual job 
supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS), Averett (1991) found that women who 
moonlight in an occupation other than managerial/professional are more likely to be 
constrained.
4
 The 1991 supplement has precise questions on the hours constraints of the 
primary job, thus the author used this information as an indicator of whether constrained hours 
was the motive for dual job holding. However, Wu (2008) found that the moonlighting in UK 
does not support the primary job hours constraint as a reason for holding dual jobs. Wu used 
the British Panel Household Survey measures to determine how satisfied or dissatisfied are 
                                                             
 
3
  We have not seen the earnings constraint argument regarding salaried jobs previously made in the literature. A 
college professor who occasionally consults might fit into either of these last two categories. The consulting job 
may pay an hourly or daily rate far in excess of one’s primary hourly earnings, but the job’s hours (longevity) is 
temporary (i.e., an hours constraint on the second job). Alternatively, the salaried professor faces an earnings 
constraint on the primary job and may choose to consult or take on paid work at a rate below one’s implicit 
wage, say, a low-paying consulting job or reviewing a textbook. Teaching summer school has a similar logic, 
although it is not classified as a multiple job if the teaching is performed for the primary employer (college).  
4
 An important point stressed in this dissertation is that salaried workers such as managers and professionals are 
“earnings” constrained in that working additional hours does not directly increase earnings. Hence, salaried 
workers may have a greater rather than lesser incentive to work at a second job than an hourly workers, all else 
the same. 
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individuals with the hours they work and found that workers who are satisfied with their 
primary jobs are more rather than less likely to take second jobs.   
A “job portfolio” framework provides several explanations for multiple job holding. A 
worker may simply prefer diversity in job tasks, being happier dividing time in two different 
jobs or occupations.
5
 In this spirit, Renna and Oaxaca (2006) develop a job portfolio model 
based on a personal preference for job differentiation. Alternatively, workers may choose to 
work a second job as a form of insurance (i.e., diversifying one’s human capital) due to a high 
level of employment or income uncertainty in a first job. Or workers wanting to switch 
occupations or employers due to a poor match may use a second job as a source of on-the job 
training that will facilitate a utility-enhancing move. Heineck and Schwarze (2004) found 
evidence for a ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ motive to hold a second job. Using German and British 
panel surveys, they found that more than 15 percent of workers simply enjoy the second job 
and 10-15 percent of the overall moonlighting workers are gaining experience to build up a 
business. Thus there exists evidence of holding multiple jobs that are dissimilar in order to 
gain desired human capital. Conway and Kimmel (1994), Kimmel and Conway (1995) and 
Kimmel and Powell (1996) also found that the moonlighters hold two jobs because the second 
job provides different non pecuniary benefits to the individual. 
Finally, a worker may choose to work at a second job for financial or family 
circumstances that are temporary, at the same time expecting that the current primary job 
offers the best long-run job match. A few studies have found that the holding of second job is 
due to a high level of uncertainty in a first job. Boheim and Taylor (2004) observed that 
                                                             
 
5
 The title of a paper by Böheim and Taylor (2004) arguably says it all: “And in the Evening She’s a Singer with 
the Band – Second Jobs, Plight or Pleasure?” 
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holding a second job increases with higher employment insecurity on the primary job. They 
used the 1990-2000 British Household Panel Survey to find that the second job holding is 
persistent rather than temporary among workers in the UK. By focusing on two-year period, 
they observed that more than half of the moonlighters who had job in the beginning of the 
period, continued to have a second job till the end of that period. Gaurigila and Kim (2004) 
found that moonlighting in Russia can work as self-insurance to mitigate financial shocks 
during downturns. Sussman (1998) used the Labor Force Survey (LFS) of Canada and 
observed that teenagers moonlight to save for the future, while many older workers reported 
that they moonlight because they enjoy the work. In addition, Krishnan (1990) concluded that 
husbands’ decisions to hold second jobs are often a substitution for wives’ labor force 
participation. This conclusion was based on use of the 1984 SIPP and estimation of a joint 
selection model of moonlighting to explore how a husband's decision to moonlight is affected 
by his wife's labor force participation. 
6
 
Given the varied reasons for which individuals hold multiple jobs, predicting how or 
why we might see differences in multiple job holding among demographic groups is 
problematic. Hipple (2010) reports multiple job holding rates and detailed descriptive 
evidence among employed workers for 1994 through 2009. Although rates for men and 
women were equivalent in 1994 (at 5.9 percent), over time rates have decreased for men 
relative to women. In 2009, the overall rate of 5.2 percent reflected rates of 5.6 and 4.8 
percent among women and men, respectively. The rate in 2009 for whites (5.4) was higher 
                                                             
 
6 A worker may also choose to work at a first job with lower wage because the primary job provides health 
insurance, at the same time holding another job to compensate the lower wage on primary job. Also, one might 
hold the secondary job because it provides better insurance and the primary job has no insurance. It is quite 
difficult to observe in our data since we do not have insurance information on secondary job. The CPS March 
supplements provide insurance information only for the primary job. 
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than seen for black (4.8), Asian (3.2), or Hispanic (3.3) workers. Marriage increases dual job 
holding for men and decreases it for women. And multiple jobs are substantially less prevalent 
among foreign-born workers, more so for non-citizens than naturalized citizens. As we will 
see subsequently, overall multiple job holding rates have decreased since 2009.  
Multiple job holding increases with education. The incidence with respect to age is an 
inverted-U, much like the age profiles for wages and hours worked on primary jobs. Primary 
job occupations with particularly high rates of dual job incidence among men are firefighters, 
emergency medical technicians and paramedics, and teachers; and among women dental 
hygienists, psychologists, teachers, and therapists. Some of these occupations (e.g., teachers) 
are salaried but earnings constrained, with hours that are either sufficiently predictable or 
flexible as to allow a second job. Those holding multiple jobs worked an average 46.8 total 
hours per week in 2009 as compared to 35.8 for single-job holders. As compared to men, 
women who moonlight were about twice as likely as men to hold multiple part-time jobs. In 
surveys asking why individuals hold multiple jobs (last asked in the May 2004 CPS), 
economic reasons are predominant, although roughly 1 in 5 cites enjoyment of the second job. 
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1.3 THEORETICAL MODEL 
1.3.1 GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
 Shishko and Rostker (1976) explored moonlighting both theoretically and empirically by 
arguing that a worker, in order to maximize utility, may have a reason to supply labor in a second job 
if she cannot work as many hours as desired in her main job. Graphically an hours constraint can be 
modeled as follows:  
Case 1: Hours constrained on primary job and w1>w2 
          Consumption 
                         I1 
                                                             
                    -w2               
I3           I2 
Y+(W1- W2) H                            
                                       -w1 
 
             L*    T-H1- h2 T-H1             T      Leisure 
Diagram 1: Utility maximizing hours-constrained dual jobholder  
 In Diagram 1, Y is non-labor income and w1 and w2 are the wages paid in the first and 
second jobs respectively, with w1>w2, T denotes total time available, H1 is the fixed hours of 
work in the first job, and h2 is the time spent in a second job. The worker is assumed to 
maximize her utility, determined by consumption and leisure, U=U(C, L). She would like to 
work T-L* hours at w1 on her first job in order to reach utility level I*, but is constrained to 
work no more than H1 hours. The decision to supply labor in a second job then depends on the 
moonlighting wage offered. The second-job reservation wage is determined by the 
indifference curve (I1) given at the intersection of the first-job wage line and the allowable 
hours H1 (shown by the dotted line). If the wage offered exceeds the reservation wage, the 
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constrained worker will take a second job that makes her better off. In the diagram, the 
moonlighting wage, w2, is higher than the reservation wage (although lower than w1). 
Therefore, the worker supplies h2 hours of work in a second job and reaches at indifference 
curve I2, which provides utility exceeding that on I1 but is less than that achieved on I
*
 if hours 
in the primary job were unconstrained. 
Case 2: Non-constrained on primary job but constrained on the second job, with w2>w1  
Consumption          -w2 
                         I2 
                                                            -w1 
                                           I3                             
                     I1 
   
 
 
     T-h1-h2  H2 T-H1 T-h1             T      Leisure 
Diagram 2: Utility maximizing non hours-constrained (on primary job) dual  jobholder. 
 Diagram 2 depicts the decision of the non-constrained moonlighter on the primary job 
in the case of a higher paying second job. Theory suggests that in the case of the non-hours 
constrained moonlighter who has a higher wage on primary job than the second job, the 
individual will always maximize utility by choosing to work more hours on the primary job 
(Averett 2001).The individual that is non-constrained in her main job can work any amount of 
hours (h1) that falls in the given standard working time span T-H1. Work in a second job might 
nevertheless be supplied, if the wage paid on the second job is higher than the one paid in the 
first job. Assuming that hours of work on the second job (h2) are a choice variable, it can be 
argued that the individual facing this situation would aim at working extra hours in her 
moonlighting job rather than working more hours on the primary job at the lower wage. The 
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w2 constraint will begin at T-h1 (worker will not deliver work up to T-H1, since they are not 
constrained on the first job). Workers would supply h2 hours of work in the second job and 
would reach at the indifference curve I2, if workers were non-constrained in the second job. 
But if the higher wage second job were always available with unconstrained hours, then the 
person would quit their first job and the “second” job would be the primary job. For some 
people second jobs can be an occasional (i.e., constrained) opportunity to receive a high 
payment, which can be either limited in hours and/or is temporary. It means that the hours of 
work on the second job are constrained. And workers supply H2 hours of work in the second 
job and reach the indifference curve I3. The discussions fit the “consulting professor” example 
provided at footnote 1. 
1.3.2 MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS  
 To identify the determinants of dual job holding, we will use a static model of the 
decision of holding dual jobs as used by Böheim and Taylor (2004). Workers’ labor supply is 
assumed to result from utility maximization. Suppose the individual holds a primary job and 
supplies h1 hours of work at wage w1, works h2 hours at secondary jobs at wage rate w2 and the 
hours of leisure is l. Since the jobs are not identical, all of these enter the utility function 
separately. 
U = (h1, h2, L; C ) 
Here C denotes consumption. The utility function is maximized subject to two constraints: 
Budget Constraint: 
(1) C h2 w2 + h1w1 + Y  
Here non labor income is denoted by Y 
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Time constraint: 
Each worker is also subject to a time constraint limiting the number of hours available in a 
week, T, for work or leisure, L: 
(2) T = h1 + h2 + L 
Maximizing U= U (T- h1- h2, h1w1+ h2w2+Y, h1, h2 ) subject to (1) and (2) and non-negativity 
constraints h10 and h2 0 yields the following first-order conditions: 
 If the worker wants to supply more hours in the first job than she is able to, it implies 
that she is constrained on the primary job and h1 is no longer a choice variable. So the 
working decision on the second job will depend on the marginal utility of working on that job, 
given the maximum number of hours have already been supplied to the first job. Finally, the 
decision to hold a second job will be determined by the marginal disutility of working in the 
second job and wage rate w2. 
                                          
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  = - w2 ----------- (3) 
 Equation (3) implies that an individual will take a second job if and only if the offered 
wage rate exceeds his or her marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure at 
zero hours of work on the second job , the second-job “reservation wage” (MRS).  
1.3.3 MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING DECISIONS: 
(4) h2 > 0 if and only if w2 > MRS and h2 = 0 if and only if w2 MRS  
Equation (4) implies a decision equation to participate in a second job. The marginal 
rate of substitution on the right hand side is assumed to be a function of demographic 
characteristics, non-labor income sources, the primary job wage rate, variables reflecting the 
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economic conditions which the individual faces, and an unobservable component. A change in 
the reservation wage is likely to affect the decision of holding a second job. 
 The critical point is that for w2 to exceed MRS and thus have the worker choose to 
take a second job, either h1 must be constrained if w2 < w1 (or, similarly, for salaried workers 
earnings must be constrained) or h2 must be constrained (or, intermittent) if w2 > w1.  
Alternatively, a second job may result if it provides sufficiently positive utility (e.g., a 
volunteer job, although these are not counted by BLS as a dual job) or provides human capital 
that will increase future earnings. 
1.4 1.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING IN THE U.S. 
 The Current Population Survey (CPS) is one of the most comprehensive data sources 
with information on multiple job holding for individuals, which in turn can provide measures 
of multiple job holding for states, metropolitan areas, industries, occupations, etc. Each month 
the CPS—conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau on behalf of the Bureau of Labor Statistics—
interviews about 60,000 households, collecting a variety of information about labor market 
behavior, demographics, and family characteristics.  
Information on multiple jobholding was collected in the CPS each May annually till 
1980. After 1980, the data were collected in May of 1985, 1989, and 1991. CPS also has 
provided occasional supplements that include information on the motives for holding multiple 
jobs. 
 Questions on multiple jobs were introduced into the monthly CPS beginning in 
January 1994. The ORG files (a quarter sample of the monthly files) contain information on 
earnings, hours, and union status of the primary job the week prior to the survey, along with 
information on detailed industry and occupation and the plethora of demographic, location, 
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and employment information collected monthly from all rotation groups. The CPS ORG files 
are extensively used for labor market research. They provide large, nationally representative, 
and timely samples of the U.S. population.  
1.4.1 MEASUREMENT OF MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING: 
 Since January 1994, all the employed respondents have been asked the following 
question in the monthly CPS: “Last week, did you have more than one job (or business), 
including part-time, evening, or weekend work?” If they answer “yes,” they are also asked 
how many jobs (or businesses) they had altogether and how many hours they worked each 
week at all their jobs. The primary job is defined as one at which the greatest number of hours 
were worked. For workers who held more than two jobs, the information on the industry, 
occupation, and class of worker for their second job is collected only for the job at which they 
worked the second-greatest number of hours.
7
  
 CPS data, much of it from an earlier era, have been used by others to examine the 
incidence of multiple-job holding (Stinson, 1986, 1990; Paxson and Sicherman, 1994; 
Kimmel and Powell, 1999). The primary advantage of CPS data is that samples are large and 
nationally representative. CPS respondents also are asked why they moonlight, although the 
set of possible responses tell us little about relative wages or hours constraints. In other data 
sets, such as the SIPP, PSID and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) it is possible 
to identify wages and characteristics of more than one job, but it is not always possible to 
discern whether or not these jobs are held simultaneously, i.e. if the person is truly 
moonlighting or had two jobs at different times or was moving between jobs (Averett 2001). 
                                                             
 
7
 This measurement method is similar to that applied by Hipple (2010), who provides descriptive evidence on 
multiple job holdings during the 2000s.  
 18 
 
Among the other national databases in U.S, the PSID and NLSY provide multiple job holding 
information in the surveys, asking about secondary employment in the previous year. Among 
the OECD countries the most useful data set regarding multiple job holding are the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), and 
German SOEP. The questions corning most often in these datasets are: (1) Has a second paid 
job? (2) Number of hours worked per month in second job? (3) Gross earnings from second 
jobs last month? (4) Occupation in second job? 
1.5 TRENDS IN THE HOLDING MULTIPLE JOBS 
The percentage of workers holding two or more jobs has shown a stable pattern during 
1994-2013. The reached a peak in 1997 (6.5 percent) before declining to below 5 percent in 
2002 (Figure 1.1)
8
.The percentage of workers holding multiple jobs was then stable prior to 
falling to about 4 percent in 2009 during the Great Recession.  
The trend in the percentage of male and female workers holding two jobs also follows 
the similar pattern of moonlighters, decreasing since the mid-1990s. For male moonlighters, 
the percentage of holding two jobs dropped gradually till 2001 after which it showed a stable 
pattern for the subsequent years. The percentage of male moonlighters decreased to a lower 
point following the Great Recession and has recently stabilized. We can see a roughly similar 
trend among female workers, but with a slower decline than seen for men. Older historical 
data on multiple job holding collected by the CPS shows that moonlighting among women 
rose steadily since the 1970s, paralleling their continued increase in overall labor force 
participation, (Stinson 1986), before showing decline in more recent years. Levenson (1995) 
also discussed the similar finding that the multiple job holding rate for women had tripled to 
                                                             
 
8
 All the figures are drawn from the tables provided by BLS and are weighted according the BLS measures 
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6.5% from 1970 to 1991 while the moonlighting rate for men continued to hold steady at 
around 6% percent during the same period. 
Figures 1.A1-1.A8 in the appendix contain the number of moonlighters by year for 
each type of jobs. The most prominent category is workers who hold a full time primary job 
and a part time secondary job. This category shows a very stable pattern but decreased sharply 
after the Great Recession of 2008. Among the other categories, the number of male 
moonlighters who hold two part time jobs has increased gradually after the recession while it 
was comparatively stable for female moonlighters. That is quite intuitive in that a number of 
workers lost full time jobs during the Great Depression and some of them were holding part 
time jobs. So we can expect the percentage holding two part time jobs would increase 
significantly after 2008. The number of female moonlighters holding two part time jobs is 
substantially higher than among male moonlighters. This is to be expected since woman with 
young children who require child care may hold two part-time jobs, one during the morning 
while her children are in school and another in the evening when her husband is home to care 
for the children (Averett 2001).  
1.5.1 TRENDS ACROSS DEMOGRAPHICS CHARACTERISTICS 
Figure 1.2 contains the moonlighters’ rate by year for each age category. The 
percentage of moonlighters for wage and salary workers ages 16–65 had relatively consistent 
differences across age groups during 1994 to 2013. Although it is fairly consistent across 
different age groups, workers age 25-54 are the most likely of all age groups to hold two jobs. 
Among men, the proportion holding more than one job increases gradually in each age group, 
reaching a peak of 6 percent for ages 25-54 and declined gradually thereafter (figure 1.6A). 
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Among women the pattern is similar. The percentage of moonlighting for women gradually 
increases up through the age of 55 and then starts dropping after age 65.  
Figure 1.3 shows the moonlighters’ rate by year for race and marital status, 
respectively. The percentage of moonlighters fell sharply among black workers during 1998 to 
2003. It started to increase progressively after that and reached a peak in 2006. The overall 
percentage of moonlighters has decreased gradually during the Great Depression. The 
percentage of moonlighters increased for Hispanic workers, however, before it reached a peak 
in 2005 and then showed a stable pattern. The percentage of white workers shows the most 
stable pattern over the years. According to historical data, the percentage of white 
moonlighters increased from 5.1 to 5.7 percent between 1980 and 1985, while the black rate 
was unchanged at 3.2 percent. The increase for whites was principally among women, whose 
moonlighting rate rose a full percentage point to 4.9 percent; the rate for white men edged up 
slightly to 6.2 percent. Hispanic women had a moonlighting rate of 2.8 percent, about the 
same as that for black women, while the rate for Hispanic men was below that of blacks and 
only half the rate of white men. (Stinson 1986). 
Figure 1.4 shows that the percentage of married workers holding two jobs are slightly 
higher than among those single or who were widowed, divorced, or separated. Kimmel (1995) 
also found the similar result that the single men have much shorter periods of moonlighting 
than married men. Married men are more likely to hold two jobs than other male workers. 
Women have a similar pattern as do men with respect to marital status (figure 1.6C).  
Finally, figure 1.5 shows the moonlighters’ rate by year for each education category. 
One sees that the percentage of moonlighters rises with the level of education. Kimmel and 
Conway, 1995; Levenson, 1995; Kimmel and Powell, 1996 also found the similar results that 
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the multiple job holding rates of men and women are highest for those workers with a college 
education. Figure 1.5 illustrates that the likelihood of holding two jobs is higher for those who 
have more education. Workers with graduate degree are most likely to hold two jobs. Clearly, 
workers with lower educational attainment are substantially less likely to hold two jobs  
relative to those with more education—particularly when we compare between workers 
without a high school diploma and those with an associate or bachelor’s degree or higher.  
1.5.2 TRENDS ACROSS MULTIPLE JOB HOLDER CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 1.1 shows trends in multiple job holding, weekly hours, average age, weekly 
earnings, and the class of workers in primary and secondary jobs for selected years over the 
1998-2013 period. As discussed earlier, the multiple job holding rate for women is higher than 
for men in all years. The 1
st
 row in the lower panel shows that age differences between male 
and female moonlighters are very small. The 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 rows show the hours worked by 
moonlighters in their primary and secondary jobs. Across all the years, male multiple job 
holders work significantly longer hours in both jobs than do women. On average, in 1998-
2013 male moonlighters worked 39 hours per week in the primary job and 15 hours in the 
secondary job. The average hours worked in the primary job is lower than the average hours 
worked by single job holder (more than 40 hours) during the same period, which suggests that 
multiple job holders are hours constrained on their primary job.  
The 4
th
 row of Table 1.1 shows weekly earning on the primary job for male and female 
moonlighters in our sample. The weekly earnings on the primary job is significantly higher for 
men, with a gender gap of around 30% across all the years. Earnings information is not 
available for the second job. The 5
th
 row shows the proportion of moonlighters who are hourly 
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wage worker on their primary job, a proportion that is higher for women than men (as is also 
the case for single job workers).  
1.5.3 MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING BY OCCUPATION AND INDUSTRY 
The likelihood of workers holding multiple jobs in various occupations changed little 
over our sample period. Table 1.2 lists the multiple job holding rates by their primary 
occupation for the period 1998-2013. Among the men moonlighters the primary occupations 
with the highest percentage of multiple job holders were “fire fighters, health diagnostic and 
treating practitioners, dental hygienists and psychologists, with average multiple job holding 
rates of 22.3, 21.0, 19.2 and 18.7 percent respectively. Among female moonlighters, the 
occupations with the highest multiple job holding rates are dental hygienists, psychologists, 
health diagnostic and treating practitioners and musicians, singers and related workers, with 
average multiple job holding rates of 11.75, 11.5, 11.1 and 10 percent respectively. These 
rates among the top female occupations are roughly half the rates seen for the top male 
occupations, indicating that multiple job holding is far more concentrated across occupations 
for men than for women.  
Table 1.3 shows similar calculations for industries. In contrast to the distribution 
across occupations, here we see quite similar concentrations of male and female moonlighters 
across industry. For both men and women, schools, instruction and educational services; 
sound recording industries; and business, technical trade school and training are among the 
primary job industries for multiple job holding. The multiple job holding rates within these 
industries are highly similar for men and women, suggesting similar concentrations across 
industries, in sharp contrast to the large gender difference we saw above in multiple job 
holding concentration across occupations. 
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1.5.4 DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE ON THE MOTIVES FOR MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING 
For selected years, May supplements to the CPS (known as the dual jobs supplements) 
ask questions concerning a second job. These surveys include a question on reasons for 
working in a second job. Notably, hours constraints are not one of the coded response 
categories. The CPS supplement question asks multiple job holders the following: “What is 
the MAIN reason that (you) worked at more than one job?” Answers are coded as: “1. Meet 
expenses or pay off debt; 2. Earn extra money; 3. Build a business or get experience in a 
different job; 4. Enjoy the second job; 5.Some other reasons.” Presumably, those for whom an 
hours constraint leads to multiple job holding would typically answer either 1 or 2 (“meet 
expenses or pay off debt” or “earn extra money”).  
Table 1.4 shows the reason for holding two jobs in U.S in 1997, 2001 and 2004.
9
  A 
somewhat higher share of workers cite economic reasons as the reason for multiple job 
holding, with these shares being somewhat higher in 2004 than in 1997 and 2001. If workers 
are working on a second job to meet expenses, or to pay off debts or to earn extra money, then 
we can define these reasons as economic reasons. Workers in 1997 are somewhat more likely 
to cite building a business or gaining experience in different jobs than later years; while 
workers in 2004 are more likely to cite enjoying a second job as a motive for a second job.  
1.5.5 TRENDS IN THE HOLDING MULTIPLE JOBS FOR MORE THAN TWO JOBS 
Table 1.5 shows trends in multiple job holding for the workers who hold more than two jobs 
over the 1998-2013 period. For the workers with more than two jobs, the age differences 
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 The table is summarized from various BLS releases & Hipple (2010). All the sources have used the same BLS 
measures and weights This information can also be accessed at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/opbilshm.htm 
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between male and female moonlighters are very small. The table also explains that the male 
multiple job holders work significantly longer hours in both jobs than do women across 
primary and secondary jobs. The weekly earning on the primary job is higher for men. 
However, the gap has decreased a little bit over the years. Finally, the table also shows the 
proportion of female moonlighters who are hourly wage worker on their primary job is 
significantly higher than men.  
1.6 DETERMINANTS OF MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING: EMPIRICAL METHOD 
 To address the factors that determine if an individual holds two jobs, I follow standard 
practice (Kimmel and Conway 1995; Heineck. and Schwarze 2004), using a bivariate probit 
model of the decision to hold one or two jobs. The model can be described as follows: 
Yi* = xi′ β +νi,        (1) 
 Here Yi* corresponds to the latent propensity of individual i to supply labor in a 
second job. Y
* 
(conditional on being employed). It is a latent variable in that it is not 
observable when the individual is not holding multiple jobs. xi is the vector of covariates 
affecting the decision to hold multiple jobs. ν is the stochastic error term. The vector x will 
include a rich set of demographic, job, and location descriptors.  
Pr (Y=1| Xi) = Pr (J=1| X1, X2, X3, ….. Xk)    (2) 
Here in equation 2, Y is the dependent variable and Xi is the set of explanatory variables. If 
we assume the error term is standard normally distributed and the model is linear in the set of 
parameters, βi, then  
Pr(Y = 1| Xi) = G(β0 + β1 X1 + …….. + βk Xk) = β0 + β1 X1 + ……… + βk Xk + νi  (3) 
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Here, G is a function that takes values strictly between 0 and 1, while νi denotes the 
disturbance term with mean zero and variance σ2  
The estimation sample includes individuals’ ages 18-64 years who are wage and salary 
workers. The explanatory variables Xi include three major categories: individual worker 
demographic characteristics, job characteristics, and location information. Demographic 
characteristics include age, education, race and ethnicity, foreign born, marital status, number 
of children in household, etc. Job characteristics include hours of work in primary job, union 
status, occupation, industry, inform of the multiple job holder. Location variables include 
(depending on specification) measures of region, city size, state, and MSA.  
 
1.7 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The data for the empirical section in this essay is taken from the 1998-2013 CPS ORG. 
Table 1.6 tabulates
10
 the descriptive statistics of some of the most important variables for 
1998-2013 by second job status. The age distribution of male moonlighters is highly similar to 
that for female moonlighters. The proportions of white and married workers (for both men and 
women) are similar, but slightly higher, for single job and multiple job holders. The 
proportion of foreign born workers is substantially higher among multiple job holders than 
among single job holders.  
  
                                                             
 
10
 Detailed information on the data, samples, and standard deviations is provided in essay2. 
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1.8 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1.7 reports the marginal effects of covariates on the probability of holding a 
second job in the U.S. for 1998-2013. Reported are OLS estimates. Probit estimates produce 
highly similar marginal effects at the sample means. The marginal effects show that men are 
more likely to moonlight than women, conditional on worker, job, and location 
characteristics. Male workers are estimated to have a 1.3 percentage point higher probability 
of multiple job holding than women, a substantive difference relative to the 5-6 percent mean 
rate seen over these years. Several characteristics affect the probability of moonlighting 
differences between men and women and also among men and women. For example, married 
men are 1 percentage point more likely to moonlight than unmarried men. Married women are 
1.9 percentage points less likely to moonlight than are similar unmarried women. The number 
of young children in the household influences the probability of moonlighting. The regression 
result shows that one additional child (age of 0-5) in the household increases the probability of 
holding more than one job by 0.20 percent for men, whereas the same variable decreases the 
probability of holding more than one job for women by 1.2 percentage points, all else 
constant. A 10 percent (.10 log points) higher wage on the primary job, conditioning on wage 
covariates, decreases the probability of moonlighting by about half a percentage point for 
women and men.  
 Foreign born male noncitizens are an estimated 1.8 percentage points less likely to 
hold more than one job relative to native men; the estimate for women is a nearly equivalent 
1.7 percentage points. Multiple job holding rates for foreign citizens are in between, but closer 
to the rate seen for native citizens. The age group dummy variables indicate that both men and 
women ages 35 to 44 are most likely to moonlight, with young workers least likely to do so. 
The educational degree variables indicate that for men and women, the probability of holding 
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multiple jobs is far and away the lowest for dropouts (the omitted group) and high school 
graduates, and highest for those with graduate degrees. The working hour dummy variables 
show that men and women with fewer than 30 hours on their primary job (the omitted 
category) are most likely to have multiple jobs, and that workers who work less than 40 hours 
are significantly more likely to moonlight compared to workers who work exactly 40 or more 
than 40 hours.  
1.9 CONCLUSION 
This essay examines the pattern and trend of multiple job holding and also the 
characteristics of moonlighters in the U.S. Over the period of our study (1998-2013), an 
average 5.3% of our urban wage and salary workers held multiple jobs. Our analysis supports 
the expectation that individuals hold second job because they are hours or earnings 
constrained in their primary job, although we are unable to test this directly. The second essay 
will carefully examine how the business cycle affects individual multiple job holding 
decisions across labor markets, after accounting for the many determinants of multiple job 
holding discussed above.  
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Table 1.1: Multiple job holding and labor market condition in U.S 
 Men Women 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 
Number 
of people 
holding 
multiple 
jobs (in 
thousand
s) 
4050 3521 3620 3210 3390 3650 3450 3680 3420 3450 
Multiple 
job 
holding 
rate 
5.9 5.1 5.2 4.8 4.6 6.2 5.6 5.7 5.4 5.2 
Multiple job holders with positive primary earning 
Age 38.94 40.07 40.58 41.05 41.33 39.09 39.85 40.72 41.06 41.05 
Weekly 
hours of 
work at 
primary 
job 
37.75 37.90 38.08 38.92 37.02 34.83 34.41 34.45 34.02 33.74 
Weekly 
hours at 
secondary 
job 
14.68 15.35 15.37 15.46 14.37 12.98 13.21 13.27 13.11 13.41 
Weekly 
earning at 
primary 
job [2013 
constant 
dollar] 
1009.5 1067.8 1054.6 1071.2 1092.1 681.7 712.6 735.1 749.8 723.2 
Proportion 
of hourly 
work at 
primary 
job 
.54 .55 .53 .54 .52 .63 .61 .62 .62 .64 
Source: Current Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group earnings files, 1998-2013.  
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Table 1.2: Multiple Job Holding Rates by Detail Occupation 
Men Women 
Name of the occupation
11
 MJH 
Rate 
Name of the occupation
12
 MJH 
rate 
Fire fighters 22.35 Dental hygienist 11.75 
Health Diagnostic and treating 
practitioner 
21.05 Psychologists 11.53 
Dental Hygienist 19.20 Health Diagnostic and treating 
practitioners 
11.10 
Psychologists 18.75 Musicians, singers and related 
workers 
10.08 
First Line supervision and 
prevention officer 
18.10 Model makers pattern makers, 
metal plastic 
9.75 
Secondary School teachers 17.75 Emergency medical technicians 
and paramedics 
9.50 
Speech language pathologists 16.94 Postsecondary School teachers 9.32 
Emergency medical technicians 
and paramedics 
16.67 Announcers 9.11 
Model makers pattern wood 16.60 Therapists 8.85 
Elementary and middle school 
teachers 
15.76 Lifeguards and other protective 
service workers 
8.64 
Source: Current Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group earnings files, 1998-2013. The 
samples are weighted. The occupations listed here are the primary job occupations of moonlighters. 
  
                                                             
 
11
 Primary job occupation of male moonlighters 
12
 Primary job occupation of female moonlighters 
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Table 1.3: Multiple Job Holding rates by Detail Industry 
Men Women 
Name of the industry MJH 
rate 
Name of the industry MJH 
rate 
Office of Health Practitioners 11.16 Sound recording industries 10.89 
Schools, instruction, and 
educational services 
11.10 schools, instruction, and educational 
services 
10.11 
Justice, public order, and safety 
activities 
10.69 Museums, art galleries, historical sites, 
and similar institutions 
10.0 
Elementary and secondary 
schools 
10.41 Logging 9.65 
Business, technical, and trade 
schools and training 
9.71 Business, technical, and trade schools 
and training 
9.64 
Child day care service 9.61 Religious organization 8.80 
office of other health 
practitioners 
9.05 Colleges and universities, including 
junior colleges 
8.51 
Outpatient care centers 8.31 Offices of chiropractors 8.18 
Source: Current Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) earnings files, 1998-
2013. The samples are weighted. The industries listed here are the primary job industries of moonlighters. 
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Table 1.4: Motive of Multiple Job Holding 
Selected Categories 1997 2001 2004 
 All Workers All workers All Workers 
To meet Expenses or pay off debt 41.4 27.8 25.6 
To earn extra money 16.6 35.4 38.1 
To build a business or get experience in 
different jobs 
7.7 4.6 3.7 
Enjoy the second job 14.5 17.4 17.6 
Other reasons 16.6 12.5 12.5 
Reasons not available 3.8 2.3 2.5 
Source: Issues in labor statistics, BLS August 2000, September 2002 & Hipple (2010). All the 
sources have used the same BLS weights and measures of multiple job holding 
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Table 1.5: Multiple job holding and labor market condition for more than two jobs holders 
 Men Women 
Year 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 
Age 41.81 40.87 40.75 42.42 40.57 39.25 41.17 40.33 41.81 41.45 
Weekly 
hours of 
work at 
primary 
job 
38.73 37.82 37.19 38.16 37.25 32.41 31.54 32.67 32.40 31.48 
Weekly 
hours at 
secondary 
job 
13.96 14.23 14.91 13.66 13.34 10.08 12.15 12.23 13.19 12.41 
Weekly 
earning at 
primary 
job [2013 
constant 
dollar] 
951.53 947.25 899.63 984.33 935.18 584.65 665.25 658.45 699.54 714.25 
Proportion 
of hourly 
work at 
primary 
job 
.48 .50 .46 .47 .44 .57 .65 .55 .61 .66 
Source: Current Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group earnings files, 1998-2013. 
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Table 1.6: Sample Means for Single and Multiple Job Workers 
Variable name 
Single job workers 
 
 
Multiple job workers 
 
 
Men Women Men Women 
Weekly hours, primary job 41.94 37.39 39.90 34.36 
Weekly hours, second job 
 
 15.08 13.17 
Hourly earnings, primary job (2013$) 22.34 17.95 22.10 18.14 
Household kids ages 0-5 0.280 0.244 0.292 0.171 
White 0.830 0.795 0.840 0.829 
Black 0.094 0.131 0.097 0.106 
Married, spouse present 0.594 0.536 0.615 0.451 
Never married 0.279 0.254 0.258 0.296 
Foreign Born 0.095 0.076 0.142 0.128 
Proportion of hourly wage 0.526 0.580 0.536 0.624 
Age < 25 0.083 0.079 0.076 0.090 
Age 25-34 0.251 0.239 0.252 0.230 
Age 35-54 0.506 0.517 0.527 0.526 
Age 55+ 0.140 0.148 0.129 0.134 
High school degree 0.295 0.279 0.222 0.203 
Some college, no degree 0.176 0.190 0.203 0.206 
Associates degree 0.084 0.108 0.107 0.125 
BA degree 0.221 0.233 0.252 0.273 
Graduate or professional degree 0.115 0.115 0.164 0.158 
Private sector, primary job 0.860 0.811 0.768 0.773 
Union member 0.146 0.124 0.187 0.139 
Sample size 903,267 863,750 47,791 46,136 
Principal data sources are the Current Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) 
earnings files, 1998-2013. Detailed information on the sample, and standard deviations, is reported in essay 
2. The unweighted mean of multiple job holding for the combined male and female urban sample over these 
years is 5.3 percent. 
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Table 1.7: Determinants of Multiple Job Holding, OLS Estimates 
 All Workers Men 
 
 
Women 
Kids less than 5 years -0.0026*** 0.0020*** -0.0120*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Female -0.0131***   
 
(0.0005)   
Black -0.0058*** -0.0019 -0.0098*** 
 
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Married, spouse present -0.0037*** 0.0099** -0.0186*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
Separated, divorced, widowed 0.0092*** 0.0100*** 0.0058*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
Log real hourly wage -0.0056*** -0.0062*** -0.0053*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Union membership 0.0050*** 0.0075*** 0.0053** 
 
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Base group ages 18-19    
Age 20-24 0.0066*** 0.0107*** 0.0050*** 
 (.0017) (.0025) (.0022) 
Age 25-34 0.0071*** 0.0142*** 0.0030 
 
(0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0020) 
Age 35-44 0.0100*** 0.0167*** 0.0055** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0022) 
Age 45-54 0.0099*** 0.0152*** 0.0066*** 
 
(0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0022) 
Age 55 and over 0.0002 0.0045* -0.0032* 
 
(0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0019) 
Base: Foreign born    
Native born 0.0176*** 0.0177*** 0.0169*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0023) 
Native by naturalization 0.0120*** 0.0125*** 0.0108*** 
 
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
HS diploma 0.0183*** 0.0156*** 0.0217*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0018) 
Some college 0.0402*** 0.0344*** 0.0446*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0024) 
Associate degree 0.0482*** 0.0430*** 0.0530*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
BA degree 0.0455*** 0.0349*** 0.0545*** 
 (.0025) (.0025) (.0030) 
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Grad degree 0.0593*** 0.0422*** 0.0734*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0037) 
Public 0.0057*** 0.0080*** 0.0068*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
Base weekly 0-30 hours    
Weekly 31-35 hours -0.0142*** -0.0094*** -0.0179*** 
 
(0.0086) (0.0015) (0.0008) 
Weekly 36-39 hours -0.0189*** -0.0170*** -0.0217*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Weekly 40 hours -0.0405*** -0.0433*** -0.0470*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Weekly more than 40 -0.0326*** -.0351*** -.0335*** 
 (.0010) (.0009) (.0012) 
Industry (base: Agriculture) Broad Broad Broad 
Construction -0.0059* -0.0104*** 0.0110 
 (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0078) 
Manufacturing -0.0081*** -0.0105*** -0.0026 
 (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0054) 
Transportation -0.0055 -0.0091*** 0.0017 
 (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0061) 
Professional & technical -0.0067** -0.0092** -0.0026 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0053) 
Education & Health 0.0123*** 0.0189*** 0.0120** 
 (0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0056) 
Occupation (base: 
Management) 
Broad Broad Broad 
Business & Finance 0.0018* 0.0022 0.0015 
 (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0016) 
Professional 0.0082*** 0.0085*** 0.0086*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0021) 
Service 0.0097*** 0.0112*** 0.0052*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0016) 
Farming -0.0109*** -0.0134*** -0.0047 
 (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0062) 
Production 0.0039*** 0.0025* 0.0044** 
 (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
Month Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 1,565,626 797,646 767,980 
R square 0.017 0.018 0.018 
Robust standard errors, clustered on MSA, are shown in parentheses. The base 
specification used unless stated otherwise. Coefficients significant at .01 level are 
shown as * starred. 
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Fig1.1: Multiple Job Holding Rate in U.S:1994-2013
13
 
Fig 1.2 Multiple Job Holding Rate by Age Categories
 
                                                             
 
13
 All the figures are drawn from the tables provided by BLS, which has monthly and annual multiple job holding 
information since 1994. All the figures are weighted according the BLS measures. The data can be accessed at 
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab9.htm 
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Fig 1.3: Multiple Job Holding Rate by Race 
 
Fig 1.4: Multiple Job Holding Rate by Marital Status 
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Fig 1.5: Multiple Job Holding Rate by Education Categories
 
Fig 1.6A: Gender Difference in Average Multiple Job Holding Rate 1994-2013 by Age
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Fig 1.6B: Gender Difference in Average Multiple Job Holding Rate 1994-2013 by Race
 
Fig 1.6C: Gender Difference in Average Multiple Job Holding Rate 1994-2013 by Marital Status
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Fig 1.6D: Gender Difference in Average Multiple Job Holding Rate 1994-2013 by Education 
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2 MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING, LOCAL LABOR MARKETS, AND  
 THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Roughly 5 percent of U.S. urban workers hold multiple jobs. A question not clearly 
answered in the literature is whether multiple job holding is countercyclical, acting as an 
automatic stabilizer that helps offset household income losses during a recession, or whether it 
is cyclical and exacerbates income variability. Neither theory nor evidence provides an 
unambiguous answer to this question. On the labor supply side, the willingness of workers to 
hold multiple jobs may be countercyclical if household income effects outweigh substitution 
effects. During a recession, for example, the desire for a second job may arise from a loss in 
work hours or other income losses on one’s primary job or from a job (income) loss by 
another household member. Even if labor supply for multiple jobs is countercyclical, 
aggregate demand and labor demand fall in a recession, resulting in fewer opportunities to 
hold multiple jobs absent extraordinary wage flexibility. Among the limited evidence that 
exists on the cyclicality of multiple job holding, authors arrive at conclusions on both sides of 
this issue.  
In this paper, we use a large micro data set for 1998-2013 in order to examine how 
multiple job holding by individual workers varies across U.S. labor markets (MSAs) with 
respect to changes in local unemployment rates. To preview our results, our large data set 
produces precise estimates that are close to zero but consistently show multiple job holding to 
be weakly cyclical, thus (slightly) exacerbating rather than mitigating labor market shocks 
over the business cycle. Most of the economy-wide variability in multiple jobs across the 
business cycle results from fixed differences across labor markets in multiple job holding 
levels (i.e., MSA fixed effects) that are correlated with unemployment rates. There exists little 
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variability within labor markets over time in response to changes in unemployment. While 
multiple job holding no doubt mitigates income shocks for many households, it exacerbates 
shocks for others and on balance appears to have little net effect.  
In addition to examining how overall multiple job holding varies with respect to local 
labor market conditions, we address several related questions. Among these is how multiple 
job holding over the cycle varies for women versus men, how it varies for workers whose 
primary jobs are salaried versus hourly, and whether responses to business conditions are 
symmetric or instead differ with respect to increases and decreases in unemployment or for 
different time periods. We also attempt to address the question of how closely second jobs 
“match” or complement primary jobs and whether the “quality” of a second job (measured by 
occupational indices of skill-related job tasks and working conditions) varies over the cycle.  
In what follows, we first discuss how multiple job holding is defined and measured, 
followed by a discussion of prior literature on multiple job holding and the business cycle. We 
then describe our database, created primarily from Current Population Survey (CPS) 
household data coupled with job descriptors from the Occupational Information Network 
(O*NET). This is followed by a description of our empirical methodology and the 
presentation and interpretation of the evidence. 
2.2 MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING AND BUSINESS CYCLE MEASURES 
In our discussion and subsequent analysis of multiple jobs, we largely follow the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in how multiple jobs are defined. The BLS defines a 
multiple job holder as an individual who: (a) holds wage and salary jobs with two or more 
employers; (b) combines a wage and salary job with self-employment; or (c) combines a wage 
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and salary job with one as an unpaid family worker.
14
 In our subsequent empirical work, we 
include only those multiple job holders whose primary job is a wage and salary job.
15
  
The Current Population Survey (CPS) first began regularly collecting information on 
multiple job holding in 1994 as part of the survey’s major redesign. Figure 2.1 shows the 
multiple job holder rate (as a percentage) from 1995-2013 in the U.S.
16
 Figure 2.2 shows the 
corresponding monthly unemployment rates. The obvious characterization of the national 
multiple job holding series is that it has gradually declined over time from just above 6 
percent at the beginning of the monthly series in 1995 to just below 5 percent in recent years. 
The rate shows no strong pattern with respect to the unemployment rate. Declines in the 
national multiple job holding rate of roughly a half percent occurred in the late 1990s when 
labor markets were tight, and again in 2009-2011 when labor markets were unusually weak. 
Multiple job holding has remained at these low levels through early 2014 even as 
unemployment rates declined sharply from historically high Great Recession levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
14
 In the BLS’s Monthly Labor Review, Hipple (2010) describes the measurement of multiple job holding and 
provides descriptive evidence. 
15
 The reason to restrict the sample in this way is that the CPS outgoing rotation group (ORG) files provide 
earnings information only for wage and salary jobs and do not report any earnings information for second jobs. 
The CPS does report work hours, occupation, and industry for a second job. 
16
 These figures are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) hourly wage series. The source is table A-16 
of the Economic Report, available at: http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab16.htm.  Although annual  
multiple job holding rates are available beginning in 1994, monthly rates are first available in January 1995.  
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Figure 2.1: Monthly multiple job holding rates in U.S from 1995-2013, all workers 
 
Year 
Figure 2.2: Monthly unemployment rate in U.S from 1995-2013 
Year 
In our empirical analysis, we use large samples of urban workers (jobs) to examine 
multiple job holding and unemployment within local labor markets in the U.S. over time. This 
approach allows us to characterize both a national pattern of multiple job holding and the 
business cycle and to observe heterogeneity in this relationship across worker groups, labor 
markets, and time period. Average rates of multiple job holding are lower in our urban sample 
than in the country as a whole.  
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There is a reasonably robust literature exploring the determinants of multiple job 
holding, but relatively little on how it varies over the cycle.
17
 CPS data, much of it from an 
earlier era, have been used by others to examine the incidence of multiple-job holding 
(Stinson, 1986, 1990; Paxson and Sicherman, 1994; Kimmel and Powell, 1999). The primary 
advantage of CPS data is that samples are large and nationally representative. In some earlier 
CPS supplements, respondents also are asked why they moonlight, although the set of 
possible responses tell us little about relative wages or hours constraints. In other data sets, 
such as the SIPP, PSID and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), it is possible to 
identify wages and characteristics of more than one job, but it is not always possible to discern 
whether or not these jobs are held simultaneously, i.e. if the person is truly moonlighting or 
had two jobs at different times or was moving between jobs (Averett 2001).  
The small literature on multiple job holding and cyclicality is not conclusive. Most 
relevant to our paper is Catalina and Kimmel (2009), who use U.S. data from the NLSY79. 
They conclude that male multiple job holding is largely acyclical, while female multiple job 
holding appeared countercyclical during the 1980s and early 1990s, but had turned procylical 
by 2000-2002. They use state employment growth as their measure of the business cycle. The 
authors provide a thorough summary of previous work.  
                                                             
 
17
 Studies examining various dimensions of multiple job holding include Shishko and Rostkers (1976), Krishnan 
(1990), Paxson and Sicherman (1996), Averett (2001), Conway and Kimmel (2009), Renna and Oaxaca (2006), 
Pouliakas et al. (2009), and Hamersma and Heinrich (2010). Partridge (2002) uses state level data to examine 
how multiple job holding varies across states and time, concluding that state differences are maintained over 
time.  
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2.3 HOW SHOULD MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING VARY OVER THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE? 
Even if more workers prefer to hold multiple jobs during downturns, it does not follow 
that multiple job holding will increase – creation of jobs requires employer demand as well as 
labor supply. To the extent that business cycles and economic conditions are defined by 
measures of economic activity, say by employment measures based on the number of jobs 
(from establishment surveys), then it follows more or less arithmetically that dual job holding 
will be cyclical, whatever the preferences of workers. Using alternative business cycle 
measures, say the unemployment rate (as in our study) or employment measured by household 
surveys in which one counts employed persons and not jobs (i.e., a dual job holder counts as 
one worker rather than as two jobs), then multiple job holding is not automatically cyclical. 
That said, it would be surprising (to us) if multiple job holding were not at least weakly 
cyclical.  
Neither the CPS nor other surveys asks employed workers if they are seeking a second 
job. Hence, we cannot directly observe or reliably estimate the labor supply for multiple jobs 
absent a strong assumption about market clearing. And it makes little sense to assume that 
markets clear if one is studying employment over the business cycle. Theory does allow us to 
assume that both income and substitution effects have an impact on labor supply for multiple 
jobs, and that their relative contributions may vary with the business cycle. During a 
recession, income effects should lead to increased desire for second jobs due to earnings 
losses on the primary job (more likely due to reductions or constraints in hours rather than 
wage reductions). Perhaps more important, search for a second job may result from a job or 
substantial earnings loss by another household member. Substitution effects work in the 
opposite direction, with a weak economy lowering wage offers in second jobs. Using the same 
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logic, during an expansionary period, income effects (i.e., higher earnings on a primary job 
and from other household members) should reduce the desire for a second job. But the 
substitution effect (i.e., more lucrative dual job wage offers) acts to increase multiple job labor 
supply.  
It is certainly possible and perhaps likely that income effects are dominant, implying 
that the labor supply of multiple jobs is countercyclical. Countercyclical labor supply for 
second jobs, however, need not result in increased multiple job holding during a recession 
since such jobs are not readily available. Regardless of whether multiple job labor supply is 
countercyclical or cyclical, the observed variation in multiple job holding is likely to be 
cyclical due to the binding constraint of labor demand. 
More opaque is how multiple job responsiveness to the business cycle differs between 
women and men and for those in hourly versus salaried jobs. Women have higher multiple job 
holding rates than do men, but the differences are trivial. Men’s unemployment tends to be 
more cyclical than for women, so one might expect employed married women to have a 
somewhat less cyclical (or countercyclical) multiple job holding response than do married 
men. That is, during a recession with large male job losses, we would expect negative income 
effects (and more husbands’ time at home) to increase married women’s willingness to take a 
second job, despite their being difficult to find. We have no priors for differences between 
unmarried men and women.  
More interesting may be differences between those in hourly versus salaried jobs. 
Weekly earnings in hourly jobs are likely to more cyclical than are earnings in salaried jobs. 
Whereas earnings in salaried jobs varies little week-to-week, earnings in hourly jobs varies 
due to changes in hours worked and in the marginal wage for overtime hours (1.5W versus 
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W). Hence, hourly workers will have stronger income effects and might exhibit less cyclical 
or more countercyclical dual job labor supply. However, if labor demand is more cyclical for 
jobs that hourly workers typically take as second jobs, compared to such jobs for salaried 
workers, those holding hourly primary jobs could well exhibit more rather than less cyclicality 
than do salaried primary job holders.  
2.4 OCCUPATIONAL MISMATCH BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY 
JOBS AND CHANGES OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
The CPS, which provides the principal source of information about multiple jobs, 
provides measures of hours worked, detailed industry, and detailed occupation for those with 
a primary wage and salary job and a second job. Earnings information is provided for the 
primary job but not a second job. Thus, there is little literature comparing the quality of the 
first and second jobs. We cannot directly overcome the absence of wage data for the second 
job.
18
 As we describe in the data section below, we are able to construct an index of 
occupational skills requirements and job tasks and an index of physical working conditions. 
The skill index is highly correlated with wages. Use of these indices allows us to compare the 
“closeness” of skill and job task requirements and of working conditions on the first and 
second jobs. This allows us to say something about how close are occupational matches 
between the first and second jobs and whether, on average, second jobs involve an upgrading 
or downgrading from the primary job. Moreover, we can study how the degree of mismatch 
varies over the business cycle. 
                                                             
 
18
 Averett (2001) uses a May 1991 CPS supplement that provides information on wages (among other things) on 
secondary as well as primary jobs. She provides analysis for women, and among those holding dual jobs, finds 
virtually identical mean wages for their primary and secondary jobs ($9.93 and $9.97, respectively). We will 
show later in the paper that the value of an occupational skill index (highly correlated with wages) is lower in 
second than in primary jobs, suggesting that this relationship may have changed over time. 
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As discussed previously, the motives for taking a second job vary, so defining 
“mismatch” in a precise way is not possible.19 Whether job mismatch tends to narrow or 
widen during a recession is likely to depend on whether economic shocks more greatly impact 
workers’ primary or second job opportunities.  
2.5 DATA  
The goal in this paper is to identify how multiple job holding responds to the business 
cycle and local labor market conditions. To examine this we use monthly Current Population 
Survey (CPS) Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) data from January 1998 through 
December 2013. Each month the CPS—conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau—interviews 
about 60,000 households, collecting a variety of information about labor market behavior, 
demographics, and family characteristics. Households are in the survey for a total of eight 
months: they are interviewed for four consecutive months (rotation groups 1-4), then out of 
the survey the next eight months, and then reenter the survey the following four months 
(rotation groups 5-8). We use the outgoing rotation group files (groups 4 and 8), the quarter 
sample each month that provides information on earnings and hours worked during the survey 
week, along with additional information on multiple jobs (see below).  
Workers in the CPS-MORG files are in the survey only once within a calendar year, 
but then appear in the survey the same month in the following year, assuming they remain in 
the same residence. Thus, it is possible to create one-year panels with two observations on the 
same worker, one year apart, for up to half of the respondents in any given year’s survey. We 
provide analysis using the full CPS-MORG files for January 1998 through December 2013. 
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 “Mismatch” may be desired for a person working in a second job for personal enjoyment or in order to acquire 
training for a new career. 
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We subsequently will present analysis using CPS panels of worker-year pairs for the years 
1998/99 through 2012/2013.
20
 The panels will provide a robustness check on our principal 
cross-section results, examining how one-year changes in the unemployment rate within labor 
markets affect worker-specific transitions into and out of multiple jobs.  
Questions about multiple jobs were introduced into the CPS beginning in January 
1994. Since then, all employed respondents have been asked the following question: “Last 
week, did you have more than one job (or business), including part-time, evening, or weekend 
work?” If they answer “yes,” they are then asked how many jobs (or businesses) they had 
altogether and how many hours they worked each week at all their jobs. The primary job is 
defined as one at which the greatest number of hours were worked. Additional questions on 
the class of the job (private for-profit, private not-for-profit, federal, state, or local), detailed 
industry occupation of the second job, and usual weekly hours worked on the second job are 
asked of the quarter ORG sample. For workers holding more than two jobs, the information 
on class, industry, occupation, and hours is collected only for their primary job and the job at 
which they worked the second-greatest number of hours.
21
  
Our base sample, as summarized in Table 2.1, includes 1,860,944 non-student wage 
and salary workers (on their primary job), ages 18-65, for 1998 through December 2013, 
located in about 250 MSAs throughout the U.S. (this accounts for roughly 70 percent of the 
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 It is not possible to match across years if the household changed residence or if individuals moved out of a 
household. Because we restrict our sample to those working in a primary wage and salary job in consecutive 
years, coupled with household changes, match rates are well below 100 percent.  
21
 In addition to information from CPS documentation, Hipple (2010) provides a clear description of how the 
BLS defines and measures multiple job holding using the CPS.  
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U.S. workforce).
22
 In this sample, the (unweighted) multiple job holding rate is 5.03 percent, 
with 1,767,017 single-job holders and 93,927 multiple job holders (few of these hold more 
than two jobs).
 
Workers self-employed in their primary job but with a wage and salary second 
job are counted by BLS as multiple job holders, but we exclude them from our sample given 
that earnings (and other) information is not provided for their self-employment job. This large 
national sample of workers for over sixteen years provides us with substantial statistical 
power and the ability to examine differences both across labor markets and over time. The 
sample sizes for hourly earnings and the unemployment rate are slightly smaller than the full 
sample shown in Table 2.1. Hence, the regression sample sizes (Table 2.2. and beyond) are 
below those shown in Table 2.1.  
Although our unit of analysis is the individual worker, emphasis is given to cross-
MSA variability in business conditions (the unemployment rate) across labor markets and 
over time, plus within-MSA variability in unemployment over time. The latter analysis is 
achieved by including MSA fixed effects in our estimating equations. Not surprisingly, we 
find that much of the cyclical response seen for multiple job holding reflects differences 
across labor markets, while there is minimal cyclical response within labor markets over time.  
Our primary measure of the local labor market business cycle is the monthly 
unemployment rate for MSAs between January 1998 and December 2013. In order to mitigate 
noise in the monthly measure, we use the three month moving average. As a robustness check, 
we also examine estimates using average monthly MSA employment growth over the 
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 There exist 242 and 264 MSAs identified in the CPS prior to and following mid-2004. We included 279 MSAs 
in our analysis, with some MSAs included in the earlier period not included in the latter period, and vice-versa. 
The sample used in  
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previous three months. This employment measure is derived from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW) database provided by BLS.  
For the analysis of occupational mismatch, we combine our CPS worker sample with 
data from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET), produced by the U.S. Department 
of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration. This database is a comprehensive 
system for collecting, organizing, and describing data on job characteristics within 
occupations. We use O*NET 12.0, released in June 2007, and created a data set with O*NET 
occupational job descriptors.
23
 The O*NET indices were created based on SOC occupation 
codes used in the CPS beginning in 2003 through 2009. These indices were matched to 
occupation codes used in the CPS prior to 2003 where relatively clean occupation matches 
could be made (workers from 35 mostly small occupations were omitted for the years 1998-
2002). Matches were also made using time-compatible occupation codes from 2010 through 
December 2013. 
In this paper, we construct indices of skill-related job tasks and, separately, physical 
working conditions from the O*NET database using factor analysis. Combining O*NET with 
the CPS allows us to account more directly for occupational skill requirements, job tasks, and 
working conditions for both the primary job and secondary jobs. Due to the imperfect 
measurement of workers’ skill based on schooling, experience and other variables in CPS, we 
include the job task skill index as a proxy for worker skill. Because the skill index is a strong 
correlate of wages, and wages are not reported in the CPS for workers’ second job, 
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 The O*NET dataset was developed by, used, and described in Hirsch and Schumacher (2012).  
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comparison of the skill index for the primary and secondary jobs provides information on 
likely differences in wages between primary and secondary jobs.  
Our O*NET indices are taken from Hirsch and Schumacher (2012). Their database 
includes 206 O*NET job descriptors. Using factor analysis, indices of occupational 
skills/tasks (SK) and physical working conditions (WC) are formed. SK indices provide linear 
combinations of the 168 skill attributes and WC indices provide linear combinations of 38 
working condition attributes. We examine the first skill factor and first working condition 
factor. Based on its factor loadings, we title skill/task SK ‘‘cognitive skills.’’ SK accounts for 
41 percent of the total covariance among the 168 skill/task attributes across 501 Census 
occupations. SK heavily loads such O*NET measures as critical thinking, judgment and 
decision making, monitoring, written expression, speaking, writing, active listening, written 
comprehension, active learning, negotiation, and persuasion. WC accounts for 56 percent of 
the total covariance among the physical working conditions and heavily loads extreme 
working conditions (e.g., temperature, lighting, contaminants, hazards) and strength 
requirements. The factor analysis is weighted by occupational employment based on a large 
CPS sample of all wages and salary workers. By construction, the factors have a mean of zero 
and standard deviation of 1.0.
24
 
2.6 DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
Descriptive evidence on our merged CPS-O*NET database is provided in Table 2.1. 
Usual weekly hours on the primary job is somewhat lower for multiple versus single job 
holders (37.1 versus 39.7 hours). Usual hours per week on a second job is 14.1 hours, so dual 
job holders work more hours on average than do single job holders. Average hourly earnings 
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 Informative descriptions of factor analysis are provided in Gorsuch (1983) and Ingram and Neumann (2006). 
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in the primary job is highly similar for multiple job and single job holders, $21.70 and $21.83, 
respectively, in 2013 dollars. Multiple job holders tend to be more educated, having a higher 
proportion of B.A. and graduate degrees than do single job holders. The proportion of 
employees who are hourly rather than salaried workers is similar for multiple and single job 
holders (58 and 55 percent, respectively). 
The descriptive data provide limited insight into the questions being asked in this 
paper. Mean MSA unemployment rates for the single and multiple job samples are similar 
(5.9 and 5.6 percent), although slightly lower among the latter sample. This small difference 
suggests that multiple job holding may be cyclical, but tells us nothing about how sensitive 
changes in job are holding relative to changes in unemployment. MSA monthly log 
employment growth is the same for both the single and multiple job samples (0.0006, or 0.72 
percent annually).  
Comparing the means of the occupational skills and working conditions indices (SK 
and WC) shows that on the primary job’s occupation, multiple job holders display a higher 
value of occupational skill (0.20 versus 0.084) and slightly less demanding working 
conditions (-0.17 versus -0.07) than do single job holders.
25
 Restricting the sample to dual job 
holders, one sees that these workers’ second jobs involved a noticeably lower level of skill (-
0.09 versus 0.20 or a 0.4 s.d. difference) and largely similar (but slightly less onerous) 
working conditions (-0.11 versus -0.17; 0.06 difference). We calculate that only 8 percent of 
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 The factor index values were compiled by Hirsch and Schumacher (2012) for all wage and salary workers for 
somewhat different years and, by construction, take on mean values of zero with a standard deviation of one. The 
principal difference in our sample is that it excludes those living outside a metropolitan area or in very small 
MSAs not identified in the CPS (about 30 percent of the workforce). The small positive means for SK and small 
negative means for WC indicate that our urban sample of workers tends to work in slightly more skilled and less 
onerous occupations than does the larger labor force including non-urban workers.  
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multiple job holders work in the same detailed occupation in their primary and second jobs. In 
wage analysis not shown, the coefficient on the SK skill index in a dense Mincerian log wage 
equation is about 0.20. Using that estimate, the 0.32 average in the skill index between 
multiple job holders’ primary and secondary jobs (.21 versus -.11) suggests a roughly 6 
percent wage advantage (0.2 times 0.32) in the primary job. Subsequent analysis will examine 
how these skill and working condition differences vary with the business cycle.  
2.7 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION: MODELS 
To examine the response of multiple jobs holding over the business cycle, linear 
probability models of multiple job holding are specified (probit estimates at the sample means 
are highly similar). That is, we estimate 
yikt = xikt β + LMkt θ + γ Ukt +ε ,      (1)  
where yikt  represents the probability of individual i in labor market k in time period t holding 
multiple jobs, conditional on being employed as a wage and salary worker. Our primary 
measure of the business cycle is the monthly unemployment rate U (averaged over three 
months) in metropolitan area k during month t.
26
 As previously discussed, we also use an 
alternative measure, the monthly logarithmic employment growth from the BLS Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages database. Local unemployment rates and employment 
measures derived from the CPS are very noisy.
27
. To check our results with use of more 
reliable local employment (or other) data based on far larger samples is very important. The 
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 The three-month average is to reduce measurement error. In results not shown, we use lagged values of U and 
obtain highly similar results.  
27
 In an article in the New York Times, Justin Wolfers discusses the poor quality of local employment data from 
the CPS. He discusses how published unemployment rates are an amalgam of the household unemployment 
survey based on tiny samples, a count of the number of people receiving unemployment benefits (which need not 
be a good measure of those unemployed given differences in eligibility), and establishment surveys measuring 
the number of people on payrolls.  
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QCEW database reduces that concern as it publishes a quarterly count of employment and 
wages reported by employers covering 98 percent of U.S. jobs, available at the county, MSA, 
state and national levels by industry.   When the business cycle measure is the unemployment 
rate, estimate of γ < 0 would indicate that multiple job holding is cyclical, γ = 0 acyclical, and 
γ > 0 countercyclical. The opposite signs apply when using the employment measure. 
The vector xikt includes demographic and human capital controls. These include 
indicator variables for education (5 dummies for 6 categories), age (3), gender, marital status 
(2), children in household (2), citizenship, union member, public employment, hours on 
primary job (4), industry (8) and  occupation (15) in the primary job, and month and year 
dummies. The vector LMkt  represents labor market (MSA) characteristics other than the 
unemployment rate. Specifically, we will first show a specification with the LM controls, 
regional dummies, metropolitan area size dummies (which we specify as base specification) 
and finally MSA fixed effects (which absorb the region and size dummies). Standard errors 
are clustered by MSA. The purpose of increasingly detailed LM location dummies is to move 
from estimates of γ based largely on cross-sectional differences in multiple job outcomes to 
estimates of LM based primarily on temporal changes in multiple job behavior within labor 
markets. 
The demand side of labor market suggests that multiple job holding will fall during 
downturns as employers provide fewer jobs, while the supply side of the market suggests that 
the desire for multiple jobs increases during downturns as employees respond to lower 
household income (possibly from reduced spousal earnings) and increased financial risk. 
Although procyclical forces are likely to dominate, net effects may be weak.  
 57 
 
Further ambiguity arises from possible asymmetry in the responsiveness of multiple 
job holding to economic expansions and contractions. To test for asymmetric response, we 
estimate a model that permits unemployment level coefficients to differ depending on whether 
the unemployment rate has increased or decreased. We examine whether the response to the 
change term differs for increases and decreases. The estimated model is  
yikt = xikt β + LMkt θ + γ
U
 UP∙Ukt + γ
D
 DOWN∙Ukt + ε ,   (2) 
where UP and DOWN are indicator variables whether the business cycle measures increased 
or decreased over the previous three months (UP is coded 1 when there is no change) and γU 
and γD represents the responsiveness of multiple job holding to the three business cycle 
measures during periods of contraction and expansion (like increasing and decreasing U), 
respectively.  
The cross-sectional model with MSA fixed effects provides one method for examining 
how within-MSA multiple job holding varies with MSA-specific changes in unemployment. 
An alternative approach is to estimate a longitudinal model, which has the added advantage of 
accounting for individual worker heterogeneity. Here we regress individual changes in dual 
job status over one year among workers remaining in the same physical household residence. 
That is, we estimate the following specification: 
∆yikt = ∆xikt β’ + γ’ ∆Ukt + ∆ε ,      (3)  
where ∆ is the change operator (time period t now represents one-year changes), and γ’ 
provides an estimate of multiple job change cyclicality, after accounting for individual 
heterogeneity. In the panel model all labor market and most individual worker controls fall out 
since few worker attributes change over time. The dependent value takes on values of -1 
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(multiple job leavers), 0 (single and multiple job stayers), and +1 (multiple job joiners). This 
model can be estimated as shown above, and also with U measure in levels included as well as 
∆U. Standard errors are clustered by MSA. In the model above, the reference group includes 
all “stayers” – both those who hold single jobs and hold multiple jobs in both years, and the 
treatment group includes both sets of “switchers” – those moving from single to multiple and 
those moving from multiple to single jobs. 
To investigate how occupational skill difference (“mismatch”) between primary and 
secondary jobs change with respect to the business cycle, we estimate regressions of a similar 
form as seen previously. Estimation here, however, is over the much smaller sample of 
multiple job holders. The dependent variables, ∆skill and ∆working conditions are equal to the 
differences in SK and WC, the O*NET indices of occupational skill requirements and working 
conditions, between workers’ primary job occupation and secondary job occupation. (i.e., the 
∆ operator here is not longitudinal, but a difference operator between jobs at a point in time).  
         xikt β + LMkt θ + γSK Ukt +ε ,      (4) 
                      xikt β + LMkt θ + γWC Ukt +ε ,   (5) 
In equation (4), a positive (negative) γSK implies that the skill advantage seen for primary jobs 
will widen (narrow) as unemployment increases (decreases). In (5), a positive (negative) γWC 
implies that working conditions in the primary relative to the secondary job will worsen 
(improve) as unemployment rises. (higher WC values imply more demanding working 
conditions).  
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2.8 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION: RESULTS 
Our initial focus is on estimates of γ, which measure the response of multiple job 
holding to differences in local labor market unemployment. In Table 2.2, we present LPM 
estimates using a base equation in which human capital and demographic characteristics are 
included, along with each worker’s wage on the primary job, plus fixed effects for hours, 
industry, occupation, year, and month (probit marginal effects evaluated at means of the X’s 
are highly similar to OLS estimates and presented in the appendix). We include regional and 
MSA size dummies in the base equation shown in Table 2.2 (below we report results from a 
specification with no location controls). We then add MSA fixed effects in the specification 
shown on the right-side of Table 2.2, with region and size dummies being absorbed. In all 
results shown, standard errors are clustered on MSA to account for error correlation among 
workers within the same labor market. 
Virtually all estimates of γ are negative, indicating that multiple job holding is 
cyclical, expanding as unemployment decreases and receding as it increases. Even if labor 
supply for multiple jobs is countercyclical due to dominant income effects, employer demands 
(job openings) are insufficient to satisfy workers’ desire for second jobs. That said, the 
magnitude of γ is modest, even absent location controls. In our base equation for the full 
sample, the estimated γ is -0.254 and highly significant, indicating that each 1 percentage 
point increase in local area unemployment (an increase in U of .01) is associated with 
decreases a .0025 lower multiple job holding rate (i.e., a quarter of by 0.3 of 1 percent). 
Relative to the mean multiple job rate of 5.3 percent in our full sample (Table 2.1), an 
unemployment rate one percentage point higher in one labor market versus another is 
associated with a 4.5 percent lower rate of multiple job holding (i.e., -.0025/.0532 = -0.047). 
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The specification shown in the first column of table 2.2 includes regional and MSA 
size dummies, but we can compare these results to a sparser model (not shown) with no 
regional or size variables included. Adding MSA dummies decreases the absolute value of γ 
from -0.294 to -0.254. So neither region nor market size has a substantial effect on the 
responsiveness of multiple job holding to the unemployment rate. However, it does not follow 
that labor market differences, unaccounted for directly in the analysis, are not important. 
When we add MSA fixed effects (which absorb region and city size effects), estimates of γ 
fall sharply and are close to zero (although sometimes close to statistical significance). For the 
full sample, the estimate of γ with MSA fixed effects is -0.0340, about a eighth as large as the 
estimate from our base specification and not significant at standard levels. The point estimate 
implies that a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment (an increase of .01 in U) is 
associated with a near-zero reduction in multiple job holding (a .00034 reduction in the .053 
dual job rate across this sample), a trivial 0.6 percentage reduction in the rate. In short, within 
U.S. labor markets, the response of multiple job holding to within-market changes in 
unemployment is largely acyclic.  
Moving beyond the unemployment rate, coefficients on the other explanatory variables 
in Table 2.2 show the determinants (or partial correlates) of multiple job holding. Because the 
correlates of multiple job holding have been previously discussed in Essay 1, we do not 
discuss these results here. We will point out that a higher hourly wage on the primary job 
makes moonlighting less likely. Thus, workers “underpaid” or with a bad job draw in their 
primary job are more likely to hold multiple jobs. This result follows based both on labor 
supply income effects and from the portfolio view of multiple job holding.   
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2.8.1 HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS 
The evidence discussed so far indicates that the multiple job holding decision shows a 
pro cyclical pattern over the business cycle. However, the result presented in Table 2.3 
assumes that the effects of the business cycle measures are experienced equally by all 
demographic groups. There is no reason to assume that the effect of business cycle on 
multiple job holding will be similar across different types of workers.  
An important question to ask is whether and to what extent these differences 
experienced by various demographic groups exacerbate or mitigate the multiple job holding 
decision over business cycle. To answer this question, we estimate the models for various sub-
population groups. Table 2.3 presents results of estimating the multiple job equations 
separately for selected groups of workers. For each group, we present estimates of γ from 
specifications both with and without MSA fixed effects.  
Given that nearly all the estimates in Table 2.3 that include MSA fixed effects are 
close to zero (but with some statistically significant), our discussion focuses more on the 
differences in results absent MSA fixed effects. We view these comparisons as informative or 
at least suggestive, although readers might reasonably disagree. 
While presenting the result of gender, we might expect differences between men and 
women due to household specialization. If so, these differences should show up more strongly 
for married than for single workers. Comparing all men versus all women, the difference in γ 
is small, -0.288 among for men versus -0.285 for women. Whenever we add MSA fixed 
effects, estimates of γ fall sharply and are close to zero, -0.053 for men and -.019 for women. 
However, if we compare married men and women, we find a more substantial difference due 
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to substantial differences between married versus single women (there is little difference 
between single and married men). For the base equation, γ for single men is -.297 and is -
0.288 for married men, compared to -0.209 and -.401 for married and single women. Adding 
MSA fixed effects, we obtain an insignificant γ for married women of 0.034 (the sole positive 
estimate of γ in Table 2.3). That is, married women are the one group we find exhibiting 
countercyclical multiple job response, presumably resulting from income effects produced by 
changes in husbands’ employment and earnings over the business cycle. These results are 
consistent with our earlier conjecture that married women would exhibit less cyclical (i.e., less 
negative) or even countercyclical multiple job responsiveness relative to married men or 
single women.  
Among single men and women, we obtain γ estimates of -0.297 and -0.401, 
respectively. These estimates demonstrate substantial differences between married and single 
women in multiple job holding, single women demonstrating a relatively strong cyclical 
pattern, particularly compared to the weak pattern seen among married women. The 
suggestion here is that multiple job holding for married women has relatively stronger 
substitution effects than for single women, consistent with their displaying greater 
substitutability between market and nonmarket activities. That said, given the absence of 
market clearing in a recession, it is not possible to distinguish between the net joint income 
and substitution effects of on labor supply from the demand effects that vary with the business 
conditions. All we can do is observe the net outcome. 
We find particularly interesting differences in γ among hourly versus salaried workers, 
a question not examined in previous literature. Hourly workers display a somewhat more 
cyclical pattern than do salaried workers, -0.334 versus -0.215. This pattern has a relatively 
 63 
 
clear interpretation. To the extent that hourly workers have more variable earnings due to 
variation in regular and overtime hours, they should have strong income effects and their 
behavior should be less cyclical (or more countercyclical). That we observe the opposite 
outcome, with hourly workers having more rather than less cyclical multiple job holding, the 
implication is that multiple job outcomes are driven mainly by labor demand, with second job 
opportunities for workers in hourly primary jobs being highly cyclical. That said, these 
differences are small and the MSA fixed effects estimates for these two groups are slightly 
different, -0.038 and -0.027 for hourly and salaried workers respectively (all these estimates 
may be affected by gender differences since women are more likely to be hourly workers).  
A important question to address is whether and how the relationship between multiple 
job holding and local labor market unemployment changed during the Great Recession, a 
period in which the rate of nationwide multiple job holding changed little, but in which there 
was substantial variation across labor markets in unemployment. The findings are reasonably 
clear-cut. Whereas we found a value of γ = -0.254 over the entire 1998-2013 for our base 
equation, restricting the sample to 2008-2010 (the recession began officially in December 
2007), we obtain a smaller but highly similar γ of -0.244 during the Great Recession. The 
MSA fixed effects estimates for the entire time period was γ of -0.034; the equivalent estimate 
during the Great Recession is even closer to zero (i.e., γ = -0.010). Although the level of 
primary and secondary job holding declined in the Great Recession, the aggregate multiple 
job holding rate changed little and differences across labor markets in response to 
unemployment were, if anything,  even smaller than normal, being less cyclical and 
effectively very nearly acyclic. In short, multiple job holding, on net, did little to either 
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mitigate or exacerbate the severity of employment and earnings losses during the Great 
Recession. 
Teachers are one of the largest occupational groups in the U.S. and have among the 
highest rate of multiple job holding (for an analysis of teacher moonlighting, see Winters 
2010). This is due in part to Census procedures. When teachers are surveyed during summer 
months, they are still coded as having teaching as their primary job, while summer jobs are 
counted as a second job. As a robustness check, we remove teachers from the main sample 
(now called “non-teachers”). Excluding teachers has relatively little effect on estimates of γ. 
We addressed how the relationship between multiple job holding and local labor market 
unemployment changed for teachers and for other occupations. The findings show that γ for 
teachers -0.366 versus -.279 for non-teachers using the base model. Interestingly, we obtain a 
substantive coefficient of -0.225 for teachers with inclusion of MSA fixed effects, the only 
group that we have found with a substantive estimate of γ in the fixed effects specification.  
Table 2.4 represents the effect of the business cycle for different groups using our 
alternative business cycle measure, a three month moving average of employment growth 
from 1998-2013. Results for most of groups show the same pattern as the unemployment 
measures. In short, most groups shows a procyclical pattern based on either business cycle 
measure. Comparing all men versus all women, the difference in γ is small in absolute size, 
0.025 among for men versus 0.074 for women. Whenever we add MSA fixed effects, 
estimates of γ fall to 0.014 for men and .062 for women. For the male equation, the magnitude 
of γ is 0.025, indicating that each 1 percentage point increase in local area monthly 
employment growth is associated with an increase of .0002 in the multiple job holding rate. 
However, if we compare married men and women, we find γ for single men is -.0087 and is 
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0.0485 for married men, compared to 0.0471 and .108 for married and single women. Adding 
MSA fixed effects, we obtain insignificant and close to zero estimates of γ for all gender 
groups. 
Note that most of the discussion in this section relied on parameter estimates from 
specifications without MSA fixed effects. Once we include labor market fixed effects, nearly 
all estimates of γ are close to zero and inconsequential (although sometimes statistically 
significant). Our initial analysis without MSA fixed effects finds there exist nontrivial 
differences in multiple job holding rates across labor markets, with a modest amount of these 
differences accounted for in our cross sectional analysis by differences in unemployment 
rates. These differences are interesting in their own right. However, to the extent that such 
estimates reflect unmeasured MSA-specific factors (MSA fixed effects) that are correlated 
with unemployment levels and that affect multiple job holding, then it is reasonable to 
conclude that γ is effectively zero and that multiple job holding is largely acyclic.  
2.8.2 INCORPORATING WORKERS HOLDING MORE THAN TWO JOBS 
We also incorporate the “super” multiple job holders (workers who hold more than 
two jobs) to see how the business cycle affects them.
28
 For this analysis, an ordered probit 
model is appropriate because this kind of model can identify not only the statistical 
significance between the business cycle variable and the more than one job holding 
information, but also discerns unequal difference between the ordinal categories, i.e., the 
number of jobs in our case.  
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 We have approximately 3% of the multiple job holders in our sample with more than two jobs. 
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Table 2.5 documents the relation between the unemployment rate and the probability 
of holding multiple jobs using an ordered probit model (where 0=Single job, 1=Two jobs and 
3= more than 2 jobs). The base specification is identical to that shown in Table 2.2. The 
results show that higher unemployment is significantly associated with holding lower number 
of jobs, absent control for MSA fixed effects.  The association between unemployment rate 
and holding a second (but not a third) job is -0.259, nearly identical to the -0.254 found 
previously using OLS in a multiple job equation (Table 2.2, column 1). The marginal effect of 
unemployment on holding more than two jobs is -0.0231, about a tenth as large as for a 
second job. This coefficient is statistically significant and reinforces previous findings that the 
multiple job holding is procyclical.  
2.8.3 ASYMMETRIC MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE  
The results to this point show that multiple job holding is mildly pro cyclical, but that 
within labor markets (i.e., with MSA fixed effects) it is largely acyclic. An interesting 
question to ask is whether multiple job holding responds symmetrically to increases and 
decreases in unemployment. To examine this question, we simply estimate separate 
coefficients on unemployment for periods of contraction and expansion, with unemployment 
interacted with UP and DOWN indicator variables based on whether unemployment increased 
or decreased in the previous three months (equation 2). To capture the effect of asymmetry in 
the regression, we are using two coefficients, the interactions of the unemployment rate with 
dummies designating whether the unemployment rate rose or fell in the previous month. If the 
unemployment rate fell then the interaction term DOWN is coded 1; if the unemployment rate 
rose then UP is coded 1. As seen in Table 2.6, coefficients are nearly identical using our base 
equation, being -0.282 during contractions and -0.285 during expansions. With MSA fixed 
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effects added, both estimates are effectively zero (-0.032 and -0.037) and far from statistical 
significance. In short, we find no evidence for asymmetry in multiple job holding responses 
with respect to increases versus decreases in unemployment. 
2.8.4 THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND OCCUPATIONAL MISMATCH BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY 
JOBS 
We now move to the analysis examines how job quality differences between primary 
and secondary jobs vary with the business cycle. As previously observed in Table 2.1, on 
average, workers’ secondary jobs have a lower O*NET occupational skill index (SK) value 
and a higher (more demanding) physical working conditions (WC) value, signaling lower job 
quality on secondary than on primary jobs. Given that the skill index is highly correlated with 
pay, while working conditions are not, these results suggest that on average second jobs pay 
less than first jobs (our guesstimate is about 6 percent less). Not examined in previous 
literature is whether job quality differences vary over the business cycle. Based on the sample 
of multiple job holders, we estimate regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
difference in either SK or in WC between the first and second jobs. Our focus is on how the 
difference in job quality varies with the business cycle. 
As seen in Table 2.7, results are reasonably clear-cut, but inconsequential in 
magnitude. The gap in occupational job quality between the primary and secondary job 
narrows slightly during recessions and widens in expansions. The coefficient on the 
unemployment rate is -1.772 (and significant at the .01 level) for the ∆SK base equation. It 
remains significant (at the .05 level) but declines to -0.214 when MSA fixed effects are added. 
Although statistically significant, these magnitudes are small. The raw mean gap in 
occupational SK between first and second jobs is 0.30 (see Table 2.1), a large second job 
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deficit that represents a nearly 1/3 standard deviation difference. However, by contrast, 
coefficient effects of a -1.772 or -0.214 multiplied by a .01 (one point) change in differences 
resulting from a one point unemployment increase are is trivial relative to the standard 
deviation in SK (by construction 1.0) or compared to the 0.3 the mean difference in SK1 and 
SK2.  
Turning to the ∆WC equations, we obtain a statistically significant (at the .01 level) 
coefficient on the unemployment rate of .937 for the base equation. The mean difference in 
WC for the primary minus the secondary job (Table 2.1) is a small -0.0034 points, indicating 
slightly less demanding working conditions in the primary job. The positive coefficient on the 
unemployment rate implies that as unemployment increases, the small advantage of less 
demanding working conditions in the primary relative to the second job narrows slightly, but 
the absolute magnitudes of these gaps are trivial compared to the standard deviation in WC 
across the workforce (i.e., close to 1.0). Adding MSA fixed effects, the coefficient is 
insignificant and effectively zero, at -.040.  
In short, there are modest occupational job quality differences between dual workers’ 
first and second jobs, with the primary job having SK and WC index values indicating 
moderately higher skills and slightly less demanding working conditions. These modest gaps 
in job quality are largely invariant to differences in unemployment differences across labor 
markets or within markets over time.  
2.8.5 LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE ON MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING  
As a check on our cross-section results, we also estimate multiple-job regressions 
using short one-year panels of workers who do not change residence over the year and are 
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surveyed in the CPS the same month in consecutive years. The principal advantage of panel 
evidence is that it accounts for worker-specific heterogeneity that may be correlated with 
multiple job holding and unemployment (i.e., person-specific fixed effects net out in the 
differencing). Rather than comparing a group of multiple job holders with a group of single 
job holders, conditioning on measured attributes, we are comparing each worker to himself or 
herself one year apart, with some workers having switched between single and multiple job 
holding. 
Our estimation sample is for the worker/year pairs 1998/99 through 2012/13. The 
sample size is 429,833.  In table 2.8, column 1 shows a specification without the average 
unemployment rate level over the two years, while this variable is included in the column 2 
specification. Estimating the longitudinal equation (3) shown previously, we obtain an 
estimate of γ’ (the coefficient on ∆U) of -0.0257 (.0197) and -0.0249 (0.0252) without and 
with the added control for the mean unemployment rate, respectively. Interestingly, the ∆ in 
unemployment rate coefficient is about 1/2 the magnitude of the cross-sectional estimate of γ 
including MSA fixed effects. Roughly similar results are expected because all persons in the 
panel are in the same MSA in year 1 and year 2 (if someone moves they are out of the CPS 
sample). Hence, both sets of analyses provide a within-MSA analysis. In short, the 
longitudinal analysis shows that multiple job holding is cyclical within labor markets over 
time, but the size of this effect is very small, with each 1 percentage point increase in 
unemployment associated with a .0001 reduction in multiple job holding relative to an overall 
urban area multiple job holding rate of 5.3 percent. This longitudinal result supports the 
conclusion that multiple job holding within labor markets is largely acyclical over time. The 
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evidence reinforces our previous conclusion based on the cross sectional analysis with MSA 
fixed effects. 
2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
Multiple job holding has the potential to exacerbate or mitigate employment changes 
over the business cycle, depending on whether it is cyclical or countercyclical. Theory is 
helpful, but inconclusive. Changes in business conditions produce substitution and income 
effects in labor supply for multiple jobs that typically cut in opposite directions. Moreover, 
whatever the preferred labor supply responses for multiple jobs over the business cycle, such 
preferences are demand constrained by the availability of potential second jobs. Even if labor 
supply is countercyclical due to dominant income effects, the availability of second jobs is 
almost certain to be cyclical absent highly flexible wages. Thus, empirical evidence is needed 
to address the question of how multiple job holding varies over the cycle, yet research on this 
topic is inconclusive. Our Current Population Survey (CPS) data set, which contains large 
samples of workers and provides information on multiple job holding over many years, makes 
it possible to obtain relatively precise estimates of these net effects.  
Virtually all the evidence we find indicates that to the extent that multiple job holding 
responds to unemployment, that response is on net cyclical rather than countercyclical, thus 
slightly exacerbating rather than mitigating the severity of the business cycle. We find that 
much of the business cycle difference in multiple job holding seen across labor markets is not 
causal, however, dropping sharply after accounting for MSA fixed effects. As seen in our 
longitudinal analysis, there is minimal response to unemployment changes within labor 
markets over time. Our large CPS sample size produces relatively precise estimates, albeit 
ones close to zero. It is not surprising that prior studies, based on evidence from far smaller 
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data sets, have produced ambiguous results, some studies concluding multiple job holding is 
procyclical and others countercyclical. 
Because there is little variation in multiple job holding within markets over time; it 
follows that national employment figures are affected little by business cycle changes in 
multiple job holding. Individual households vary their job holding over time in ways that 
benefit them financially and enhance well-being. Some of that variation is cyclical and some 
countercyclical. But in the aggregate, multiple job holding is largely acyclic and plays a 
(perhaps surprisingly) small role in labor market dynamics over the business cycle.  
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Table 2.1: Sample Means for Single and Multiple Job Workers 
Variable name Single job 
workers 
 
Standard 
deviation 
Multiple 
job 
workers 
Standard 
deviation 
Weekly hours, primary job 39.71 9.74 37.06 11.01 
Weekly hours, second job 
 
 14.10 10.16 
Hourly earnings, primary job (2013$) 21.83 17.28 21.70 15.10 
MSA Unemployment Rate 0.059 0.024 0.057 0.023 
MSA Log Employment Growth BLS  .0006 0.008 0.0006 0.008 
Primary job skill index, SK1 .084 .998 .201 .981 
Second job skill index, SK2   -.097 .999 
Primary job working cond. index, WC1 -.074 .985 -.170 .920 
Second job working cond. index, WC2 
 
 -0.116 0.861 
Proportion hourly workers in primary job .552 .497 .581 .493 
Household kids ages 0-5 0.262 0.589 0.230 0.562 
Female 0.489 0.499 0.513 0.499 
White 0.813 0.389 0.834 0.371 
Black 0.112 0.316 0.102 0.302 
Married, spouse present 0.565 0.495 0.531 0.499 
Never married 0.267 0.442 0.277 0.447 
U.S. citizen 0.905 0.356 0.943 0.319 
Age < 25      0.081 0.273 0.083 0.276 
Age 25-34   0.245 0.430 0.241 0.427 
Age 35-54      0.512 0.854 0.526 0.884 
Age 55+ 0.144 0.351 0.132 0.338 
High school degree 0.287 0.452 0.212 0.409 
Some college, no degree 0.183 0.387 0.205 0.403 
Associates degree 0.095 0.294 0.116 0.321 
BA degree 0.227 0.418 0.263 0.440 
Graduate or professional degree 0.115 0.319 0.161 0.367 
Private sector, primary job 0.840 0.365 0.770 0.420 
Union member 0.136 0.342 0.163 0.369 
Sample size 1,767,017  93,927  
Principal data sources are the Current Population Survey Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group 
(CPS-MORG) earnings files, 1998-2013, and occupation skill and working condition 
descriptors from O*NET.  
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Table 2.2: Unemployment Effects on Multiple Job Holding, by Area 
 
Base 
Specification 
Base Specification+ MSA 
FE 
 MSA unemployment rate -0.254* -0.0340 
 
(0.024) (0.0254) 
Kids less than 5 years -0.002* -0.0029* 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
Kids 6-17 years 0.0002 0.0004* 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Female -0.014* -0.012* 
 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
Black -0.004* -0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.0009) 
Married, spouse present -0.005* -0.004* 
 
(0.0008) (0.0009) 
Separated, divorced, widowed 0.009* 0.008* 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) 
Real hourly wage -0.005* -0.005* 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) 
Union membership 0.005* 0.005* 
 
(0.001) (0.0012) 
Base group ages 18-19   
Age 20-24 0.010* 0.009* 
 (.0016) (.0014) 
Age 25-34 0.011* 0.0108* 
 
(0.0015) (0.0014) 
Age 35-44 0.013* 0.014* 
 
(0.0018) (0.0016) 
Age 45-54 0.014* 0.014* 
 
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
Age 55 and over 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
Base Foreign born   
Native born 0.013* 0.012* 
 (0.0012) (0.0010) 
Native by naturalization 0.0074* 0.0078* 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) 
HS diploma 0.0106* 0.0104* 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) 
Some college 0.027* 0.024* 
 
(0.0014) (0.0012) 
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Associate degree 0.031* 0.029* 
 
(0.0013) (0.0013) 
BA degree 0.032* 0.031* 
 (.0017) (.0014) 
Grad degree 0.041* 0.040* 
 
(0.0018) (0.0014) 
Public 0.007* 0.0068* 
 
(0.0014) (0.0014) 
Base weekly 0-30 hours   
Weekly 31-35 hours -0.024* -0.0236* 
 
(0.0015) (0.0015) 
Weekly 36-39 hours -0.033* -0.032* 
 
(0.0017) (0.0016) 
Weekly 40 hours -0.048* -0.047* 
 
(0.003) (0.0013) 
Weekly more than 40 -.052* -.052* 
 (.0018) (.0016) 
Occupation Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Region Yes No 
MSA size Yes No 
MSA FE No Yes 
Sample Size 1,565,626 1,565,626 
R square 0.017 0.018 
Robust standard errors, clustered on MSA, are shown in parentheses. The base 
specification used unless stated otherwise. Coefficients significant at .01 level are 
shown as * starred. Data are CPS. The “base” specification includes month, year, 
region, and MSA size dummies, while the “base+MSA FE” specification adds 
MSA fixed effects (absorbing region and size dummies).   
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Table 2.3: Unemployment Effects on Multiple Job Holding, by Worker Group 
 
Base 
Specification  
Base + 
MSA FE     R
2
 R
2
 N 
All Sample -.254* 0.017 -0.0340 0.018 1,565,626 
 (.024)  (0.0254)   
Men -.288* 0.016 -.053 0.018 797,646 
 
(.040) 
 
(.031) 
 
 
Women -.285* 0.016 -.019 0.018 767,980 
 
(.061) 
 
(.033) 
 
 
Married men -.288* 0.017 -.037 0.020 473,359 
 
(.039) 
 
(.041) 
 
 
Single men -.297* 0.015 -.082* 0.016 324,287 
 
(.058) 
 
(.0346) 
  
Married women -.209* 0.016 .034 0.018 406,909 
 
(.044) 
 
(.038) 
 
 
Single women -.401* 0.017 -.075 0.016 361,071 
 
(.097) 
 
(.051) 
  
Hourly workers -.334* 0.017 -.038 0.017 872.591 
 
(.051) 
 
(.029) 
  
Salaried workers -.215* 0.016 -.027 0.016 693,051 
 
(.049) 
 
(.032) 
 
 
Teachers -.366* 0.025 -.225* 0.032 86,052 
 
(0.099)  (0.107) 
  
Non Teachers -.279* 0.014 -.026 0.015 1,479,574 
 
(0.057) 
 
(.038) 
 
 
Foreign born -.207* 0.016 -.016 0.016 141,542 
 
(.056) 
 
(.055) 
 
 
Natives -.294* 0.016 -.038 0.018 1,424,084 
 
(.054) 
 
(.026) 
 
 
All workers, 2008-2010 -.244* 0.015 -.010   0.020 325,236 
 
(.063) 
 
(.048) 
  
The table shows coefficients on the local labor market monthly unemployment rate, 
ranging from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors, clustered on MSA, are shown in 
parentheses. The base specification used unless stated otherwise. *Coefficients 
significant at .01 level are shown as starred. Data are CPS. In addition to the monthly 
MSA unemployment rate, the base regression includes indicator variables for education 
(5 dummies for 6 categories), age (3), gender, marital status (2), children in household 
(2), citizenship, union member, public employment, hours on primary job (4), industry 
(8), occupation (15), months and year dummies. The “base” specification includes 
month, year, region, and MSA size dummies, while the “base+MSA FE” specification 
includes MSA fixed effects. 
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Table 2.4: Employment Growth Effects on Multiple Job Holding, by Worker Group 
 
Base 
Specification  
Base + 
MSA FE     R
2
 R
2
 N 
All Sample .0613 0.016 .0402 0.018 1,532,973 
 
(.0312) 
 
(.0254) 
 
 
Men .0255* 0.016 .0143 0.018 781,210 
 (.0440)  (.0394)   
Women .0744 0.017 .0617 0.018 751,763 
 
(.0501) 
 
(.0490) 
 
 
Married men .0485 0.017 .0375 0.020 463,730 
 
(.0519) 
 
(.0474) 
 
 
Single men -.0087 0.015 -.0232 0.016 317,480 
 
(.0625) 
 
(.0582) 
  
Married women .0471 0.016 .0401 0.018 398,537 
 
(.0589) 
 
(.0598) 
 
 
Single women .1081* 0.014 .0828 0.016 353,226 
 
(.0761) 
 
(.0729) 
  
Hourly workers .0407 0.017 .0307 0.017 853.730 
 
(.0403) 
 
(.0369) 
  
Salaried workers .0699 0.016 .0658 0.016 679,243 
 
(.0491) 
 
(.0472) 
 
 
Teachers 0.229 0.016 0.0395 0.016 84,344 
 
(0.154)  (0.0341)  
 
Non Teachers .0.236 0.014 0.0291 0.015 1,448,629 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.0314) 
 
 
Foreign born .0801 0.016 0.0763 0.016 138,452 
 
(.0644)  (.0627)  
 
Natives .0459 0.017 .0346 0.018 1,394,521 
 
(.0387) 
 
(.0345) 
 
 
All workers, 2008-2010 .1632* 0.018 .0563 0.020 325,533 
  (.0825) 
 
(.0720)     
The table shows coefficients on the local labor market monthly logarithmic employment growth using 
the bureau of labor statistics data. Robust standard errors, clustered on MSA, are shown in parentheses. 
The base specification used unless stated otherwise. *Coefficients significant at .01 level are shown as 
starred. Data are CPS. In addition to the monthly MSA unemployment rate, the base regression 
includes indicator variables for education (5 dummies for 6 categories), age (3), gender, marital status 
(2), children in household (2), citizenship, union member, public employment, hours on primary job 
(4), industry (8), occupation (15), months and year dummies. The “base” specification includes month, 
year, region, and MSA size dummies, while the “base+MSA FE” specification includes MSA fixed 
effects  
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          Table 2.5: Marginal Effects of Unemployment from Ordered 
               Probit Model of Workers with More than Two Jobs 
 
Base 
Specification 
Marginal Effect on taking second jobs -0.2595* 
 
(0.0456) 
Marginal Effect on taking more than 
two jobs 
-0.0231* 
 
(0.0041) 
All Controls Included 
*All coefficients significant at .01 level are starred 
Table 2.6: Asymmetric Response of Multiple Job Holding 
to Changes in Unemployment 
 
Base Spec. Base+MSA FE 
Unemployment Increasing -0.282* -0.032 
 
(.048) (.025) 
Unemployment Decreasing -0.285* -.037 
 
(.049 ) (0.038) 
R-squared 0.018 0.026 
Observations 1,565,626 1,565,626 
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Table 2.7: Primary-Secondary Job Differences in Skills and  
Working Conditions, Unemployment Rate Coefficients 
 
 Base Specification Base+MSA FE 
Dependent variable: 
  Skill Index difference -1.772* -0.214 
 
(-0.393) (-0.442) 
R
2
 0.133 0.140 
Dependent variable: 
  
Working Conditions diff 0.937* -0.040 
 
(-0.283 (-0.405) 
R
2
 0.194 0.200 
Observations 64,675 64,675 
Table 2.8: Panel Analysis of Multiple Job Holding 
Dependent Variable: ∆ Multiple job holding 
 
Unemployment rate (level)                 --                      0.0053* 
                                                                                   (0.0135) 
∆ Unemployment rate -0.0257 -0.0249 
 
(.0197) (0.0252) 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Observations 429,833 429,833 
 
* Coefficient significant at .01 level. 
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3 WHAT EXPLAINS REGIONAL AND LABOR MARKET VARIATION IN 
MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Geographical differences in multiple job holding rates have received little attention in 
the academic literature. This is perhaps surprising given that multiple job holding rates in 
some regions of the country are substantially higher than in other regions, and these 
differences have been persistent over time. Multiple job holding rates in the Western North 
Central, Mountain, Northwest, and New England states are substantially higher than in other 
regions. Rates are lowest in the South. As seen in the second essay, multiple job holding 
displays a weak procyclical pattern over the business cycle, absent control for MSA fixed 
effects, but this relationship is effectively zero (i.e., acyclic) following control for MSA fixed 
effects.  
The goal of this essay is to explain the systematic (i.e., long-run) differences in 
multiple job holding across labor markets (MSAs). Stated alternatively, we will examine the 
size and pattern of MSA fixed effects; that is, those differences in multiple job holding across 
U.S. labor markets that cannot be accounted for by detailed covariates. It is hoped that by 
examining correlates of these labor market differences in multiple job holding, we might 
better understand the determinants of labor supply and how local labor markets work.  
In what follows, we first examine the pattern of labor market differences in multiple 
job holding and the extent to which these differences can and cannot be explained by standard 
measures. We then turn to other potential explanations for the geographic pattern in multiple 
job holding and provide tentative evidence. In the end, we have limited ability to account for 
these market differences. That said, the exercise is informative and may lead to future research 
that will further our understanding of multiple job holding in local labor markets.  
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3.2 LABOR MARKET DIFFERENCES IN MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING OVER THE 
LONG RUN: THE MSA FIXED EFFECTS PUZZLE  
Multiple job holding rates differ substantially across labor markets. In this brief 
section, we first show the size of these differences over the 1998-2013 period among roughly 
250 U.S. metropolitan areas. The testable question is to what extent controlling for a variety 
of detailed worker, job, and city size attributes can account for labor market differences in 
multiple job holding. We begin by controlling for a rich set of attributes, most of which were 
previously used as covariates in the multiple job holding models estimated in essay 2. To the 
extent that these individual demographic and job attributes fail to account for differences 
across markets, thus producing substantive MSA fixed effects, we then explore possible labor 
market attributes that might account for these differences in multiple job holding.  
To describe the magnitude of MSA differences in multiple job holding, we measure 
the mean absolute deviation of MSA fixed effects estimated from individual level multiple job 
holding equation for 1998-2013, as seen previously in essay 2. We move from an equation 
with no controls, in which case MSA fixed effects provide the same information as do raw 
means on multiple job holding, to equations with increasingly detailed controls. Figure 3.1 
shows the weighted mean absolute deviation using five specifications in the multiple job 
holding equation. The first specification includes only MSA fixed effects, with no controls, 
thus measuring the unadjusted average dispersion. The second specification adds control for 
worker demographic characteristics, the third adds job-level controls measuring union status, 
class of worker, wages and hours worked on the primary job, and workers’ broad occupation 
and industry, the fourth adds detailed industry and occupation dummies and hours worked in 
the primary job, and the fifth adds city size dummies.  
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As shown in Figure 3.1, the weighted mean absolute deviation of MSA multiple job 
holding absent controls is 0.0129 (i.e., a 1.3 percentage point average absolute difference 
between MSA rates and the mean rate of multiple job holding).
29
 This average deviation from 
the mean is roughly a quarter of the size of the mean level of multiple job holding of about 5 
percent. Worker demographic differences explain a modest amount of the dispersion across 
markets, the mean deviation decreasing from 0.0129 to 0.0105. Adding controls for broad 
industry and occupation and other job characteristics reduces the intercity mean deviation 
surprisingly little, from 0.0105 to 0.0095. The further adding of both detailed industry and 
occupation codes and the hours worked in the primary job reduces mean deviation from 
0.0095 to 0.0086. Finally, adding a set of city size controls decreases the mean absolute 
deviation from 0.0086 to 0.0075. In short, controlling for highly detailed individual, job, and 
city size attributes accounts for about 42 percent of total dispersion in multiple job holding 
across labor markets.  
In the analysis above, we did not control for the nine U.S. Census regions. If we add 
region dummies to our most dense specification, the unexplained mean deviation in multiple 
job holding declines substantively, from .0075 to .0054 (raising the “explained” portion to 58 
percent). Of course, “region” is not really an explanation for why labor markets differ in 
multiple job holding. Rather, the puzzle is simply redefined to ask why there exist systematic 
regional differences that help produce overall labor market (MSA) differences in multiple job 
holding. In this next section, we discuss possible alternative explanations that might help 
solve the puzzle of why long-term multiple job holding rates differ substantially across 
regions and individual labor markets.  
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 Delineation of the control variables added in each specification are included in the note to Figure 3.1. 
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3.3 REGIONAL AND CITY-SPECIFIC VARIATION IN MULTIPLE JOB 
HOLDING: DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
As noted above, multiple job holding rates vary across the U.S labor markets, with 
systematic regional as well as MSA-specific differences. High multiple job holding states are 
concentrated and persistent in the North Central region and other northern states, while five of 
the seven states with multiple job holding rates persistently below the national average are 
located in the South. As seen subsequently, we find a similar regional pattern when we 
examine MSAs with the highest and lowest multiple job holding rates based on mean rates 
calculated over 1998-2013. Less clear is why there exist such strong regional differences in 
multiple job holding, an issue we subsequently address, but with limited success.  
Figure 3.2 shows the multiple job holding rate by states for different years. This figure 
illustrates the points made above. The multiple jobholding rate has been persistently higher in 
northern states and persistently lower in southern states during 1998 to 2013. Among the 
states where the multiple job holding rates have been most persistently above than national 
average are South Dakota, Wyoming, and Hawaii. The states of Texas, Missouri, and Georgia 
have had persistently lower than average rates of multiple job holding. Table 3.1 shows the 
rankings of states with highest and lowest multiple job holding rate during 1998-2013. North 
Dakota, South Dakota and Nebraska are the highest ranked states with 7.94, 7.88 and 7.62 
multiple job holding rate respectively. Florida, Georgia and Louisiana have had the lowest 
multiple job holding rates during 1998-2013 with rates of 3.32, 3.36 and 3.38, respectively. 
The multiple jobholding rates for MSAs show a regional pattern similar to that seen 
for states. Table 3.2 shows MSAs with the highest and lowest multiple job holding rates 
during 1998-2013. The top portion of the table shows the MSAs with the highest multiple job 
holding rates and the lower portion those with the lowest rates. Consistent with the regional 
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state pattern seen previously, MSAs in northern states report significantly higher multiple job 
holding rates than MSAs in southern states. Among the MSAs with the highest multiple job 
holding rates are Champaign-Urbana, IL (12.8 percent), Lawrence, KS (11.7 percent), and 
Iowa City (10.8 percent). It is interesting that each of these modestly sized cities hosts large 
state universities. MSAs with the lowest multiple job holding rates include a large number 
located in the South. Among the lowest ranked MSAs are not only very small MSAs in the 
South and Southwest, but also several large metro areas such as Miami, New Orleans, and 
New York, the latter being unusual given its location outside the South.  
It is worth noting that small MSAs with rather small CPS sample sizes should be most 
likely to show up with unusually high or low multiple job holding rates due to sample 
variation. While sample variability would be a serious problem were we examining annual 
rates of multiple job holding, with data merged over multiple years, sample sizes should be 
sufficiently large to mitigate these concerns. Moreover, one can observe among the MSAs the 
same regional pattern seen for states, where sample sizes are far less a concern.  
Also included in these tables is the log employment growth of each MSA between 
1998 and 2013 using data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). In 
the section below, we will consider employment growth differences as one of several possible 
explanations for long-term systematic differences in the level of multiple job holding. 
Interestingly, employment growth differences in cities are correlated with the differences in 
the multiple job holding rates. For table 3.2, the calculated (unweighted) mean of annual 
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employment growth
30
 is 0.0080 for the high MJH MSAs and 0.0112 for the low MJH MSAs. 
That is, employment growth is nearly 1.5 times higher in the low MJH markets than in the 
high MJH markets.
31
  
3.4 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR REGIONAL AND CITY RESIDUAL 
VARIATION IN MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING  
In the analysis presented above, detailed worker and job controls proved unable to 
account for systematic differences in multiple job holding rates across U.S. labor markets. It is 
not obvious to us what unmeasured factors might best explain these large residual differences 
in multiple job holding. We consider four possibilities below – differences in local labor 
market employment growth rates, regional differences in the degree of churn (turnover), 
differences in commuting costs across labor markets, and different cultural attitudes toward 
work across the U.S. that are not reflected in standard demographic measures. In what 
follows, we empirically examine the first possibility. The remaining three possible 
explanations can be examined in future research. 
A principal economic explanation for multiple job holding is that it results from hours 
constraints on the primary job (as discussed in essay 1). It is reasonable to expect that such 
hours constraints are more likely in labor markets with slow rates of labor demand and 
employment growth, while being less constrained in high growth labor markets. Of course, we 
cannot easily distinguish between employment growth driven by labor demand versus labor 
supply. A cursory comparison of MSAs and states with high versus low multiple job holding 
rates suggests that dual jobs are more likely in markets with lower long-run employment 
                                                             
 
30
 Annual employment growth is calculated by the log difference for 2013 minus 1998, divided by the total 
number of years. 
31
 That said, we have not found a strong correlation between the MJH fixed effect and annual employment 
growth 
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growth, consistent with the argument that hours constraints due to sluggish demand growth 
increase multiple job holding. We examine this below.  
A second possible explanation for residual differences in labor market churn and 
multiple job holding is the degree of labor market churn or dynamism. The idea is that 
multiple job holding is associated with labor market churn and that MSA with high (low) 
levels of churn have high (low) rates of multiple job holding. Recent literature has noted that 
the U.S. is exhibiting a gradual decline in overall labor market churn (separations and hires), 
possibly reflecting a lower degree of dynamism in the U.S. economy (Decker et al., 2014). 
Similar patterns and concerns have been noted with respect to worker mobility. Internal 
migration within the U.S. has shown a gradual but steady decline since the early 1980s, 
raising further concerns that labor mobility and economic dynamism have fallen (Molloy et al. 
2011, 2014).  
Hyatt and Spletzer (2013) find that secular employment losses are associated with 
fewer short-term (one-quarter) jobs. Elsewhere, it is suggested that multiple job holding may 
be similar in some ways to short-term jobs (Abraham et al. 2013); hence, the recent gradual 
decline in multiple-job holding may be associated with lower churn and fewer short-term jobs. 
As noted by Abraham et al. (2013), there are substantial differences in measuring multiple job 
holding based on household (CPS) versus using establishment data. Using data matching 
individual worker information with administrative employer-reported data indicated that 
establishment measures of multiple jobs within the same quarter often do not coincide with 
CPS worker reports of multiple job holding. Likewise, CPS reports of multiple job holding do 
not always show up in administrative payroll records as two jobs within the same quarter.  
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In future work, we will examine whether labor market differences in turnover, 
measured by separations and hires, is associated with the level of multiple job holding. 
Separations and hires can be measured at the local level using Quarterly Workforce Indicators 
(QWI) data. Our expectation is that this will not be a substantive factor in explaining residual 
market differences in multiple job holding. In order for it to do so, we would need to see 
particularly high levels of churn in the north central states (and northern states generally) and 
low levels of churn elsewhere in the country, particularly the South. We would be surprised to 
see such a pattern. If it is a significant factor, we will need to rethink the mechanisms through 
which labor market churn is related to multiple job holding. 
A third possible explanation, and one with greater promise, is that low commuting 
costs in a labor market will be associated with higher rates of multiple job holding, and vice-
versa. This is a natural extension of the work by Black et al. (2014), who find that 
metropolitan areas such as Minneapolis, with low rates of traffic congestion, having higher 
rates of female labor force participation than do more congested labor markets (e.g., the New 
York metro area) with long commute times. A quick glance at state rates of multiple job 
holding show Minnesota (and surrounding states) with among the highest multiple job holding 
rates, while New York has a relatively low rate multiple job holding rate as compared to other 
northern states. The New York MSA is one of the few non-southern metro areas in the list of 
MSAs with low multiple job holding.  
Multiple job holding decisions might be particularly sensitive to congestion costs. 
Because commuting is largely a fixed cost and hours worked at second jobs are substantially 
lower than in primary jobs, the relative costs of congestion are particularly high in second 
jobs. Black et al. (2014) find that married women are particularly sensitive to high commute 
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costs. Using the same logic, we would expect female multiple job holding to be more sensitive 
to commute costs than is male multiple job holding. Census data for 2000 and, subsequently, 
the American Community Survey (ACS), provide data on commute times (as well as 
transportation mode and number of vehicles). It seems likely that differences in commute 
times should explain some portion of the systematic residual differences we find in multiple 
job holding across labor markets. We believe it is unlikely that commuting costs will be a 
“magic bullet” that accounts for much or most of these differences. However, the fact that city 
size dummies accounted for a non-trivial fraction of the residual differences in MSA multiple 
job holding rates (Figure.3.1, specification 5) makes it likely that commuting costs is a part of 
the answer as to why multiple job holding systematically differ across labor markets. 
The high rates of multiple job holding in the north central states gives rise to the 
possibility that ethnic, religious, and cultural differences may be affecting labor market 
outcomes. This region of the country has large numbers of households who are Lutheran 
and/or of German and Scandinavian heritage. Data on religion by area is limited and not 
provided by Census or other governmental statistical agencies, although more limited data on 
religion is available. The CPS, which provides data on multiple job holding, includes little 
information on ethnicity, apart from identifying those who are Hispanic, and provides no 
information on ancestry other than country of origin among those who are foreign born. Data 
on ancestry, however, is available in the ACS, although we know little about the reliability of 
these data. The data should be sufficient to demonstrate whether ancestry differences across 
U.S. labor markets are correlated with long-run differences in multiple job holding. 
Interpretation of such evidence may prove more difficult.  
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As previously stated, we will briefly examine the relationship between market 
differences in multiple job holding and employment growth. Examination of the effects of 
labor market churn, commuting time, and cultural differences will await further study. 
3.5 MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH ACROSS MSAS 
In this section, we examine the relationship between labor market (MSA) multiple job 
holding rates over the 1998-2013 period and average employment growth. Our expectation is 
that multiple job holding is higher in markets with low growth owing to a higher likelihood of 
there being hours constraints. We show both scatterplots of the MSA multiple job 
holding/employment growth pairs, and draw the weighted OLS regression line through these 
points. It is important to use weights since there are such substantial differences in MSA size. 
Using weights lessens the impact of measurement error among small MSAs. Moreover, the 
weighted relationship can be thought of as a nationwide average for urban workers. We show 
each of these relationships using both the unadjusted mean multiple job holding rates over 
1998-2013, and the adjusted rates, as measured by the MSA fixed effects from our dense 
specification, absent regional controls (this corresponds to specification 5 in the MAD 
calculation as shown earlier in the essay in Figure 3.1).  
The unadjusted and regression-adjusted scatterplots of MSA multiple job holding on 
annual employment growth rates are shown in Figures 3.3A and 3.3B. Mean employment 
growth, shown as an annual average, is calculated as the log differences in employment 
between 2013 and 1998, divided by 15.  
Overall, we can conclude that employment growth and multiple job holding rates 
across MSAs have a weak negative relation. In short, differences across labor markets due to 
employment growth differences account for little of the systematic long-run differences in 
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local multiple job holding rates. An alternative way to make the same point is to return to our 
multiple job holding equation, as estimated earlier in this essay (Figure 3.1). Adding average 
annual employment growth rates to specification 5 in Figure 3.1, the mean absolute deviation 
of the MSA fixed effects declines only slightly, from 0.0086 to 0.0081.  
3.6 MULTIPLE JOB HOLDING AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION  
A final relationship shown is that between MSA multiple job holding rates over the 
1998-2013 and the MSAs mean labor force participation rate over the same period. This is 
shown in Figure 3.3D (as with the previous figures, this relationship is employment 
weighted). What is readily evident is a strong positive relationship between LFP and multiple 
job holding.   
How should one interpret this relationship? It is not merely a mechanical relationship 
in which the two measures move together. LFP is the share of the adult population in the labor 
force. The multiple job holding rate is calculated as a share of those employed who hold 
multiple jobs. Thus, there is no mechanical reason for multiple job holding rates to increase 
with the size of the labor force or with employment, as long as these labor force statistics are 
measured by workers as estimated in household surveys, rather than by number of jobs as 
measured in establishment survey, the latter double counting dual job holders.  
Our interpretation of the positive relationship is that common forces are affecting job 
creation of both primary and secondary jobs. Such forces can work through labor supply 
and/or labor demand, although theory suggests that labor supply effects are more likely to 
work in the same direction. For example, high commuting costs affect labor supply by 
decreasing the return to work (via a fixed cost) and is likely to reduce LFP, employment, and 
multiple job holding. A strong (weak) work ethic is likely to increase (decrease) labor supply 
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and these same three measures. On the other hand, high levels of labor demand increase LFP 
and employment, but have ambiguous effects on multiple job holding, decreasing the 
likelihood of multiple jobs if there are fewer hours constraints, but possibly creating attractive 
dual job opportunities that would not be available with more sluggish demand.  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The main implication of our analysis is that although there are persistent difference in 
the regional and market-specific multiple job holding rates across the U.S., only a rather 
modest amount of this variation is readily explained by detailed worker, job, and city size 
measures. Moreover, the unexplained variation that exists has a strong regional component. A 
small portion of that regional variation appears to be due to slower long-run growth rates in 
regions with high multiple job holding, consistent with there being hours constraints on 
primary jobs in slow-growing markets. Other explanations that warrant further examination 
include differences in commuting costs, regional differences in culture and work ethic, and 
differences in the amount of labor market dynamism (churn).  
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Table 3.1: Rank of States with Highest and Lowest Multiple Job Holding Rate, 1998-
2013 
Rank of the States with higher average multiple job rate, 1998-2013 
Rank  Name MJH rate  
1  North Dakota 7.94  
2  South Dakota 7.88  
3  Nebraska 7.62  
4  Minnesota 7.48  
5  Vermont 7.32  
6  Wyoming 7.26  
7  Montana 7.18  
8  Iowa 7.00  
Rank of the States with lower average multiple job rate, 1998-2013 
Rank  Name MJH rate 
1  Florida 3.32 
2  Georgia 3.36 
3  Louisiana 3.38 
4  Alabama 3.42 
5  New York 3.59 
6  California 3.56 
7  Arkansas 3.62 
8  New Jersey 3.66 
9  Nevada 3.72 
10  Texas 3.85 
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Table 3.2: MSAs with the Highest Multiple Job Holding Rates 
Rank MSA Name MJH Rate Annual Employment Growth
32
  
1 Champaign-Urbana, IL 12.8 -.0018  
2 Lawrence, KS 11.7 .0061  
3 Iowa City, IA 10.79 .0163  
4 Madison, WI 10.97 .0154  
5 Columbia, MO 9.24 .0113  
6 Sioux Falls, SD 9.11 .0175  
7 Kingston, NY 9.09 .0068  
8 Fargo, ND 9.07 .0226  
9 Topeka, KS 8.97 .0038  
10 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 8.68 .0123  
11 Provo-Orem, UT 8.08 .0257  
12 La Crosse, WI 8.00 .0005  
13 Harrisonburg, VA 7.83 .0077  
14 Eugene-Springfield, OR 7.82 .0022  
15 Holland-Grand Haven, MI 7.67 -.0052  
16 Utica-Rome, NY 7.64 .0017  
17 Bowling Green, KY 7.62 .0193  
18 Rochester-Dover, NH-ME 7.55 -.0182  
19 Minneapolis-St Paul-Bloomington, MN 7.53 .0072  
20 Chico, CA 7.50 .0062  
21 Lexington-Fayette, KY 7.47 .0099  
22 Duluth, MN-WI 7.28 .0025  
23 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 7.22 .0075  
24 Green Bay, WI 7.22 .0074  
25 Des Moines, IA 7.19 .0134  
  
                                                             
 
32
 Annual employment growth is calculated by the log difference for 2013 minus 1998, divided by the total 
number of years.  
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Table 3.2 (continued): MSAs with the Lowest multiple job holding rates 
Rank 
 
MSA Name 
 
MJH Rate 
Annual Employment 
 Growth
33
 
1 
 
Farmington, NM 
 
0.55 .0159 
2 
 
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, TX 1.28 .0342 
3 
 
Athens-Clark County, GA 
 
1.52 .0071 
4 
 
El Centro, CA 
 
1.98 .0157 
5 
 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 
 
2.19 .0214 
6 
 
Vero Beach, FL 
 
2.30 .0017 
7 
 
  Ocala, FL 2.33 .0195 
8 
 
Victoria, TX 2.53 .0121 
9 
 
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX 
 
2.71 .0017 
10 
 
El Paso, TX 2.80 -.0134 
11 
 
Anderson, IN 
 
2.89 .0171 
12 
 
Visalia-Porterville, CA 
 
2.93 .0107 
13 
 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 2.97 -.0107 
14 
 
New York-New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 2.97 .0161 
15 
 
 Fresno, CA 
 
2.97 .0204 
16 
 
Montgomery, AL 3.06 .0084 
17 
 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 3.10 .0077 
18 
 
Mobile, AL 
 
3.13 -.0012 
19 
 
Longview, TX  3.14 .0098 
20 
 
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 3.14 -.0032 
21 
 
Warner Robins, GA 3.16 .0199 
22 
 
Corpus Christi, TX 
 
3.16 -.0055 
23 
 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC MSA 3.19 .0366 
24 
 
Bakersfield, CA 
 
3.21 .0173 
25 
 
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 3.26 .0222 
  
                                                             
 
33
 Annual employment growth is calculated by the log difference for 2013 minus 1998, divided by the total 
number of years.  
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Figure 3.1: Mean Absolute Deviation Calculation 
 
Variables controlled in the specifications 
Specification 1: MSA Dummies, no other controls 
Specification 2: MSA Dummies+ Worker Characteristics (Includes: age dummy, sex, race, 
marital status, number of kids in the household, citizenship, education dummies) 
Specification 3: MSA Dummies+ Worker Characteristics + Job Characteristic (includes: 
Wages, Hours work on primary job, union membership, class of workers, broad occupation 
categories i.e., 10 occupation categories, broad industry categories i.e., 16 industry categories) 
Specification 4: MSA Dummies+ Worker Characteristics +Job Characteristic+ Detailed 
industry and occupation (roughly 200 industries and 500 occupations) 
Specification 5: MSA Dummies+ Worker Characteristics +Job Characteristic+ Detailed 
industry and occupation + MSA size dummies 
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Figure 3.2: Persistence of Multiple Job Holding Rates in US Sates 
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Figure 3.3A: Multiple Job Holding Raw Mean and MSA Annual Employment Growth 
 
Figure 3.3B: Multiple Job Holding Adjusted Mean and MSA Annual Employment Growth 
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Figure 3.3C: Multiple Job Holding Raw Mean Differences and MSA Employment Growth 
 
Figure 3.3D: Multiple Job Holding Raw Mean and MSA Labor Force Participation Rate 
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APPENDIX 1 
Figure 1.A1: Number of multiple job holders, primary job full time, second job part time
34 
 
Figure 1.A2: Number of multiple job holders, primary and second both part time
 
                                                             
 
34
 All the appendix figures are drawn from the tables provided by BLS and are weighted according the BLS 
measures. The data can be accessed at http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab9.htm. The horizontal axis 
measures years and the vertical axis measures the number of multiple job holders (in 1000s) in all the appendix 
figures. 
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Figure 1.A3: Number of multiple job holders, primary and second both job full time
 
Figure 1.A4: Number of multiple job holders, hours vary on primary or second job
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Figure 1.A5: Number of male multiple job holders, primary job full time, second job part time 
 
Figure 1.A6: Number of female multiple job holders, primary job full time, second job part time 
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Figure 1.A7: Number of male multiple job holders, primary and second both part time 
 
Figure 1.A8: Number of female multiple job holders, primary and second both part time 
 
Figure 1.A9: Number of male multiple job holders, primary and second both job full me
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Figure 1.A10: Number of female multiple job holders, primary and second both job full time 
 
Figure 1.A11: Number of male multiple job holders, hours vary on primary or second job 
 
Figure 1.A12: Number of female multiple job holders, hours vary on primary or second job 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 2.A1: Employment Effects on Multiple Job Holding Using QWEC 
Area Employment Growth Measures 
 
Base 
Specification 
Base Specification+ MSA 
FE   
MSA monthly employment growth 0.061* 0.040 
 
(0.031) (0.0254) 
Kids less than 5 years -0.003* -0.0029* 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
Kids 6-17 years 0.0002 0.0002* 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Female -0.014* -0.012* 
 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
Black -0.004* -0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.0009) 
Married  -0.005* -0.004* 
 
(0.0008) (0.0009) 
Married but  0.009* 0.009* 
 
(0.0006) (0.0005) 
Real hourly wage -0.005* -0.005* 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) 
Union membership 0.005* 0.005* 
 
(0.001) (0.0012) 
Base group ages 18-19   
Age 20-24 0.009* 0.009* 
 (.0016) (.0014) 
Age 25-34 0.010* 0.0108* 
 
(0.0015) (0.0014) 
Age 35-44 0.013* 0.013* 
 
(0.0018) (0.0016) 
Age 45-54 0.013* 0.014* 
 
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
Age more than 55 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
Base Foreign born   
Native born 0.013* 0.012* 
 
(0.0012) (0.0010) 
Native by naturalization 0.0073* 0.0078* 
 
(0.0013) (0.0012) 
HS diploma  0.011* 0.0105* 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) 
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Some college 0.027* 0.026* 
 
(0.0014) (0.0012) 
Associate degree 0.031* 0.029* 
 
(0.0015) (0.0013) 
BA degree 0.032* 0.031* 
 (.0017) (.0014) 
Grad degree 0.041* 0.040* 
 
(0.0018) (0.0014) 
Public 0.007* 0.0068* 
 
(0.0014) (0.0014) 
Base weekly 0-30 hours   
Weekly 31-35 hours -0.024* -0.023* 
 
(0.0015) (0.0015) 
Weekly 36-39 hours -0.032* -0.032* 
 
(0.0017) (0.0016) 
Weekly 40 hours -0.048* -0.047* 
 
(0.003) (0.0013) 
Weekly more than 40 -.052* -.051* 
 (.0018) (.0016) 
Occupation  Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes 
Month  Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes 
Region  Yes No 
MSA size  Yes No 
MSA FE No Yes 
Sample Size 1,532,973 1,532,973 
R square 0.017 0.018 
Robust standard errors, clustered on MSA, are shown in parentheses. The base 
specification used unless stated otherwise. Coefficients significant at .01 level 
are shown as * starred. Data are CPS. The “base” specification includes month 
and year dummy while the “base+MSA FE” specification includes regional (8) 
and MSA size dummies (5) and MSA fixed effects.  
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Table 2.A2: Unemployment Effects on Multiple Job Holding, by Worker Group, 
Marginal Effect Estimates from Probit Models 
 
Base 
Specification  
Base + 
MSA FE     R
2
 R
2
 N 
Men -.296 0.016 -.053* 0.018 797,646 
 
(.040) 
 
(.031) 
 
 
Women -.290 0.016 -.023* 0.018 767,980 
 
(0.0595) 
 
(.033) 
 
 
Married men -.288 0.017 -.037* 0.020 473,359 
 
(.039) 
 
(.041) 
 
 
Single men -.297 0.015 -.082* 0.016 324,287 
 
(.058) 
 
(.0346) 
  
Married women -.209 0.016 .034* 0.018 406,909 
 
(.044) 
 
(.038) 
 
 
Single women -.401 0.017 -.075* 0.016 361,071 
 
(.097) 
 
(.051) 
  
Hourly workers -.334 0.017 -.038* 0.017 872.591 
 
(.051) 
 
(.029) 
  
Salaried workers -.215 0.016 -.027* 0.016 693,051 
 
(.049) 
 
(.032) 
 
 
Teachers -.328 0.025 -.234* 0.032 86,052 
 
(0.049)  (0.027) 
  
Non Teachers -.184 0.014 -.042* 0.015 1,479,574 
 
(0.057) 
 
(.038) 
 
 
Foreign born -.197 0.016 -.027* 0.016 141,542 
 
(.056) 
 
(.055) 
 
 
Natives -.302 0.016 -.045* 0.018 1,424,084 
 
(.054) 
 
(.026) 
 
 
All workers, 2008-2010 -.244 0.015 -.010*   0.020 325,236 
 
(.063) 
 
(.048) 
  
The table shows coefficients on the local labor market monthly unemployment rate, ranging 
from 0 to 1. Robust standard errors, clustered on MSA, are shown in parentheses. The base 
specification used unless stated otherwise. *All coefficients significant at .01 level except those 
starred (i.e., regressions with MSA fixed effects). Data are CPS. In addition to the monthly 
MSA unemployment rate, the base regression includes indicator variables for education (5 
dummies for 6 categories), age (3), gender, marital status (2), children in household (2), 
citizenship, union member, public employment, hours on primary job (4), industry (8), 
occupation (15), months and year dummies. The “base” specification includes month and year 
dummy while the “base+MSA FE” specification includes regional (8) and MSA size dummies 
(5) and MSA fixed effects.  
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